Between Promises, Illusions and Continuity: Donald Trump’s Policies in the ‘Middle East’
Has Donald Trump sounded the death knell for US ‘imperialism’ in the Middle East?
Donald Trump is not the author of a new book for the history of the United States (US): he merely wrote his name in the long list of American presidents who have tried to influence the ‘Middle East’. Indeed, there is a perception in the collective consciousness, that the “US has been ‘at war’ in the Middle East for more than a quarter of a century” (Zenko 2018: 18). To counter this general impression, Trump placed himself as the writer of a revival, promising to sign the end of American presence in the region. However, with the end of his presidency, one can only notice that the long-waited ‘pivot’ did not take place. This essay will argue that Donald Trump did not constitute a change in the US ‘imperialist’ history in the Middle East. To understand whether there has been a transformation in the region, one must first examine whether the US can qualify as ‘imperialist’. Subsequently, this essay will evaluate whether Trump’s policies constitute a turning point. Finally, the essay will question whether Trump could have changed the regional landscape even if he wanted to.
Imperialism and US involvement in the Middle East
To understand whether the US can be qualified of imperialist, and whether Trump changed the regional landscape, it is necessary to understand what enters in the definition of ‘empire’.
Imperialism is the procedure which allows empires to be created and maintained (Doyle 1986). While imperialism’s definition is sufficiently perspicuous, the task seems more difficult for the term ‘empire’. Indeed, generally defined as the correlation between an ‘agent’ and a ‘principal’ whereby the former imposes control on the effective sovereignty of the latter, empires encompass a spectrum of nuances and variations (Doyle 1986). It has been argued that the quintessence of empires can be found in the metropoles, the peripheries, or even in the anarchical international system (Doyle 1986). But these different theories – each depicting only one side of the story – seem to be insufficient to analyse the sensitive case of the US and its influence in the Middle East.
A more refined theory, painting the entirety of the picture – with its modulations and subtleties – is necessary. This theory is provided by Michael Doyle (1986) and his classification, embracing notably variations between ‘formal’ (‘living there in person’) and ‘informal’ (‘friendly government’) empire. For Doyle, one should look at the weight of power and the policy direction. For example, if the agent wants to control the principal on the foreign and domestic policy arena, then one can talk of an ‘empire’. However, if the agent wants to control the principal only on foreign policy, then one should refer to ‘hegemony’. Moreover, if the agent wants to constraint the principal on both arenas, then it is ‘dependence’. If only in foreign policy, it is a ‘sphere of influence’ (Doyle 1986).
Doyle’s theory allows us to discern more clearly the relationship between the US and the Middle East. Before the 1990s, US’s involvement in the region was minimal and indirect, suggesting more a relation of hegemony or sphere of influence (Simon et al, 2015). However, this situation came to a halt with the presidencies of H. W. Bush and Clinton. With the Gulf War, and the Operation ‘Desert Storm’ conducted in 1991, Bush senior was able to guarantee an unconstrained military presence in regions such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar (Zenko 2018). This situation allowed Clinton to create his ‘dual containment’ policy permitting not only a growth in military presence, but also a rupture in the balance between Iraq and Iran (Freeman 2015). These factors indicating an increased control over FP and DP, suggest that the US is getting closer to the definition of ‘empire’. Yet, the apotheosis seems to have been reached by the next president, W. Bush. Following the 9/11 attacks, the latter started a ‘war against terror’, whose objective was to face the terrorist threat and ensure that the ‘axis of evil’ did not develop weapons of mass destruction (Dodge 2018). To this end, W. Bush’s policy consisted of restricting the sovereignty of Middle Eastern states, pursue regime changes, and promote a facade known as ‘democracy’ (Dodge 2018). All these elements suggest a step towards an informal empire.
As we can see, Doyle’s theory is particularly significant in identifying the imperialist or hegemonic traits of US’s foreign policy in the Middle East. Following his definitions, it seems that since the 1990s, American politics have tended to lean towards hegemony, and even in some cases, to a form of imperialism. With the election of Trump, and his policy of ‘America First’, it has been argued that US’s ‘imperialist’ position has come to an end. But it is questionable whether this statement is correct, in particular, if one looks at the policies pursued by his predecessor, Obama.
The dawn of a new era?
With his election in 2016, it was widely argued that Donald Trump would sign the dawn of a new American foreign policy. Today, with the end of his presidency, one can only notice that Trump’s presidency was not radically different from that of his predecessors, especially Obama.
The similarities between Trump and Obama are numerous. For example, both presidents considered the Iraq War and the Bush doctrine to be mistakes (Gause 2017). For them, the invasion of Iraq was a “catastrophic misjudgement that had opened the doors to humanitarian suffering, civil war, virulent new forms of jihadism, and greater Iranian regional power” (Lynch 2015: 19). This reluctance vis-a-vis W.Bush’s political style, has several implications. One of them is that Trump and Obama can be seen as proponents of the ‘offshore balancing’ theory (Zenko 2018). The latter postulate contends that US’s military forces deployment in the Middle East endangers US’s interests in the region, and creates dependence on American security guarantees (Zenko 2018). To counter this situation, both presidents advocated ‘surrogate warfare’ by which the burden of war is transferred partially or wholly to human or technological surrogates to avoid the cost of war (Krieg 2016). By providing air forces to regional allies during the Libya campaign, by employing non-state actors as surrogates on the ground to fight ISIS combatants, and by using drones to attack terrorists in countries such as Pakistan, Trump and Obama have repeatedly delegated the burden of warfare to surrogates in order to achieve US ‘leadership from behind’ (Krieg 2016, Gause 2017). To reach the latter goal, both presidents also encouraged ‘multilateral retrenchment’ whereby the burden is shifted to global partners such as NATO (Krieg 2016, Norrlof 2018).
With a similar approach for Syria and ISIS, weapons sales to Saudi Arabia, the continued military presence in the region, and even the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (both Trump’s and Obama’s initiatives have failed) it is hard to distinguish the policies adopted by Trump from those of Obama (Gause 2017, Lynch 2015, Black 2018, Zenko 2018). The main difference between the two is their relationship with Iran. Whilst Obama was a proponent of diplomacy and achieved a nuclear deal with the ‘hegemon’ of the Middle East, Trump on the contrary adopted a more hardline and confrontational rhetoric against Iran (Freeman 2015, Lynch 2015, Cause 2017, Black 2018). However, as Gause argued, Trump’s position against Iran did not constitute a radical departure from the traditional American position (Gause 2017). Even Trump’s attempts to depart from the liberal order and ‘deep engagement’ did not realise, as he frequently offered transactional partnerships and alliances to regional allies (Dodge 2018, Norloff 2018, Friedman Lissner et al. 2018).
Following the same foreign policy patterns as Obama, Trump did not distinguish himself radically from his predecessor (despite declaring otherwise). A few questions arise. Firstly, can we consider Obama’s – and conjuncturally Trump’s – presidency as imperialist? Obama’s failure with the Arab spring (whose consequences still echo today), the unauthorised intervention in Libya leading to its collapse, the persistent military presence in the region since 25 years, and the ‘blurry’ role adopted by the US in Syria, are all elements leading to wonder if ‘imperialism’ was really eschewed in the region (Dodge 2018, Lynch 2015, Zenko 2018). However, the Iran deal, the undertaking of surrogate warfare, and the adoption of ‘offshore balancing’ are all factors suggesting a return to a ‘hegemonic’ position. Secondly, even if Trump wanted to change US’s position in the Middle East, would he be able to do so? Do US presidents have the agency to decide which stance to take or are they submitted to ‘structural realities’ (Lynch 2015)?
Independent forces and agency
Even if Donald Trump have had the agency to change the situation in the Middle East, he would still have been subjected to structural forces beyond his control. Indeed, a US president may have the agency as commander-in-chief to act independently in the foreign policy arena (e.g. Bush and Iraq or Obama and Libya). However, as one can see with the failure of the Arab spring, the continual Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the failure to end the war in Iraq and Afghanistan and the collapse of Libya, agency might not be sufficient. The main explanation is that there are ‘structural realities’ which influence the final outcome of a president’s policy, his decisions, as well as the options available to him (Lynch 2015). This essay argues that ‘agency’ and ‘structure’ are not separated: instead, they are interdependent and mutually constitutive.
US presidents such as Trump are submitted to structural forces coming from outside and within.
From outside, US presidents are subjected to the consequences of past policies such as the one conducted during the ‘war on terror’ and ‘dual containment’ (Freeman 2015). As Pillar argued, the invasion of Iraq “still accounts for much of the regional shaking, having stimulated civil warfare in Iraq, region-wide sectarian conflict and the birth of what became Isis” (Pillar 2017: 52). Moreover, even if Trump wanted to encourage regional allies to take more responsibility for their own security, this objective might fail as the capacity of the regional militaries are still insufficient and underdeveloped (e.g. Golf Cooperation Council countries still heavily depend on US protection) (Freeman 2015, Simon et al. 2015, Zenko 2018). Furthermore, US presidents are constrained to keep ties with regional allies because they still have a heavy military presence there, a need for low-priced oil, and alliances to counter terrorism (Zenko 2018, Dodge 2018). In addition to these factual elements, US presidents are also submitted to ideological and identity factors. Indeed, the spread of jihadism, the emergence of pan-Islamic identity, and US’s relationship with Israel are all factors putting pressure on America, and making Middle Eastern states less answerable to the US (Dodge 2018, Simon et al. 2015).
From within, US presidents are increasingly facing domestic opposition when starting a war in the Middle East (Pillar 2017, Krieg 2016, Lynch 2015). This war-fatigue is notably what led to the election of Obama and Trump (Krieg 2016). Domestic issues, such as the coronavirus pandemic, unemployment, and racial discriminations, seem to be what occupies the heads of Americans at the moment. This war-fatigue is also what prompted Obama and Trump to resort to surrogate warfare, as it minimises political, military and public opinion costs (Krieg 2016).
Then, one can wonder: what can US presidents do to eschew US presence in the Middle East? As was seen before, diplomacy, offshore balancing, and surrogate warfare are all effective ways. Curbing weapons proliferation, minimise violent actions, learn from the mistakes made, encourage the reconstruction of countries devastated by wars caused by the US, and forge regional stability should all be US presidents’ priorities to reduce American presence in the Middle East (Pillar 2017, Simon et al. 2015).
To conclude, not much has changed in the Middle Eastern landscape since Trump’s election. As was seen in the essay, the US has tended to take steps towards ‘imperialism’. Obama and Trump attempted to change the path, but structural realities much stronger than their agency kept them from accomplishing this mission. Will their successor, Joe Biden, be able to turn things around?
References
Andreas Krieg, ‘Externalizing the burden of war: the Obama Doctrine and US foreign policy in the Middle East.’ International Affairs 92.1 (2016): 97-113.
Carla Norrlof, ‘Hegemony and inequality: Trump and the liberal playbook,’ International Affairs, Volume 94, Issue 1, January 2018, Pages 63–88
Freeman, C. W. (2015), ‘Lessons from America’s Misadventures In the Middle East.’ Middle East Policy, 22: 65-72
Gregory Gause, ‘The Trump Administration and the Middle East’ ISSF Policy Series 2017. https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/190695/issf-policy-series-trump-administration-and-middle-east
Ian Black ‘Donald Trump and the Middle East.’ Political Insight 9.1 (2018): 22-25.
Marc Lynch, “Obama and the Middle East.” Foreign Affairs 94 (2015): 18.
Micah Zenko, ‘US Military Policy in the Middle East: an Appraisal’ Chatham House Research paper (2018) https://reader.chathamhouse.org/us-military-policy-middle-east-appraisal
Michael W. Doyle, ‘Imperialism and Empire’ in Michael W. Doyle, Empires, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986) pp. 19-47.
Paul R. Pillar (2017). Trump and the Middle East. The National Interest, (147), 49-57
Rebecca Friedman Lissner & Mira Rapp-Hooper (2018) ‘The Day after Trump: American Strategy for a New International Order,’ The Washington Quarterly, 41:1, 7-25
Simon, Steven, and Jonathan Stevenson. ‘The End of Pax Americana: Why Washington’s Middle East Pullback Makes Sense.’ Foreign Affairs, vol. 94, no. 6, 2015, pp. 2–10.
Toby Dodge, ‘US foreign policy and the Middle East’, in Mick Cox and Doug Stokes (eds.), US Foreign Policy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018 [3rd Edn]), pp. 173-195.
