Does Russia Possess Soft Power?
Joseph Nye defined soft power as the ability to shape other actors’ preferences through co-optation and attraction rather than through force or the threat of force. All major powers possess soft power to a certain degree as states’ soft powers, according to Nye (2008), are derived from three primary resources: culture, political values, and foreign policy. The structure of this article reflects the field of research on this topic. Firstly, an examination of definitional difficulties of the Western concept of soft power in a Russian context will be undertaken. Secondly, how the Kremlin has recently articulated soft power will be unpacked. This is followed by an analysis of Russian Soft Power in the post-Soviet space looking at its influence on neighbouring elites and the Russian diaspora. Subsequently, an investigation into Russian soft power influence in the post-Soviet space will be conducted. Next, Russian soft power success in Western Europe will be analysed. Finally, this article will look at how financial constraints affect Russia’s ability to possess and utilise soft power.
Before commencing analysis, it must be noted that there are significant definitional difficulties when conceptualising Russian soft power. Nye’s particular conception of soft power most accurately describes the attractiveness of liberal democracies, with its emphasis on civil societies, non-state actors, and ‘universal values’ (Kiseleva, 2015). Due to Nye’s universalist focus, there is little emphasis placed on different audiences. Most Russian soft power analyses take an instrumentalist approach, focusing on soft power production as opposed to reception. However, in Russia’s case, certain types of soft power are received better in specific geographic regions. Considering which section of society has soft power agency shows another way Russian soft power differs from Nye’s original conception. Russia has a ‘preference for state-directed approaches to realising soft power’ instead of civil society actors (Wilson, 2015). However, there will always be difficulties measuring the extent to which a western concept fits within a Russian context. Just because Russia does not match the orthodox western understanding of soft power does not mean that it does not possess attractive features. Russia’s reinterpretation of the western concept of soft power is even itself an exercise of discursive soft power.
Within the post-Soviet space, Moscow has significant attractive power among the elites. Its political system offers a different model of democratic development in which elites can still maintain their predominance in the economy and society. The Russian language is also more commonly used by elites in the post-Soviet space. However, this masks the fact that Russian is declining in use, and Moscow has ‘no strategy for reaching the younger generation in those countries’ (Rutland & Kazantsev, 2016). This presents serious issues for a key Russian soft power resource going forward, with Russian language use declining significantly in all post-Soviet states bar Belarus. (Johnson, 2017). The loss of linguistic dominance has been accompanied by ‘derussification’ in certain areas of the post-Soviet space like central Asia. These states increasingly look towards China as the future due to the relative stagnation of the Russian economy.
Russian soft power primarily targets the Russian diaspora in the post-Soviet space. Whilst this is an extremely receptive audience for Russian soft power, consuming Russian media and identifying with Moscow, their loyalties are likely to already lie with Moscow. Instead of attempting to re-orient new segments of foreign populations towards Russia, significant soft power resources are spent mobilising compatriots who already agree with Moscow. Whilst this may be an inefficient use of scarce soft power resources, it can also backfire against Russia’s interests by inflaming ethnic cleavages. Ukraine and the Baltic countries offer an excellent example of this dynamic. They all possess significant Russian minorities and see Russia’s attempts to connect with these minorities as threatening to their nations’ territorial integrity. In 2013, there was a sizeably greater association with the ‘Russian World’ concept in western Ukraine (36.3%) compared to Russian speaking eastern Ukraine (12.9%) (Feklyunina, 2016). One would expect this association dynamic to be the other way round. Still, the observed results are explained by the ‘negative emotional intensity that a potential collective identity with Russia evokes’ (Feklyunina, 2016). Some perceive Russian soft power influence in the region to be tantamount to hybrid warfare by sowing the seeds of division and covertly supporting separatist groups. These dynamics demonstrate that Russia does possess soft power resources, but doesn’t always exercise them in a way that increases Russian influence. Influence is a key part of the soft power equation and Russia’s inability to convert its resources into influence demonstrates its limits.
Within the study of soft power, there exists an embedded assumption that non-liberal values are not attractive. Nonetheless, scholars have identified three categories of Russian ideological soft power influence that resonate strongly with far-right parties in Europe: moral conservatism, illiberal governance, and strong leadership (Keating & Kaczmarska, 2019). Putin’s strength as a leader and the Kremlin’s autocratic style of governance are a source of enormous respect for far-right parties, who see Putin’s Russia as a model for leadership. Russia’s moral conservatism in the political space is a significant source of soft power and has been emulated by right-wing leaders in Hungary and Poland. Russia is seen as a defender of traditional conservative Christian values and possesses significant attractive power among this segment of European populations. However, Russia did not rely on its attractive power alone and also actively sought out supporters in Europe ‘trying to split the EU along various dimensions’ (Busygina, 2018). The timing of this is crucial; Russia attempted to utilise its conservative soft power resources to shield itself from the political fallout of its controversial foreign policy decisions. The most salient example of this leveraging of soft power is supporting populist, Eurosceptic parties who advocate for removing EU economic sanctions against Russia (David & Romanova, 2019). The Russian influence in Europe demonstrates that Russia possesses attractive soft power. Still, once again, it is limited as the appeal is restricted to a narrow group.
A significant trope of Russia’s soft power efforts is their limitation by financial constraints. Russian relative economic power has declined vis-a-vis other major powers like China and the USA, and they are trying to compete against them in the arena of soft power on a ‘shoestring budget’. This financially limiting environment has led to Russia relying on its Soviet-era positive-image-making experiences to exercise its soft power in a post-Soviet space. Russia has utilised its historical legacy and revitalised the Soviet-era practices like ‘friendship societies’ (Wilson, 2015). The times when Russia has been able to increase its influence via soft power, coincide with high global oil prices. Oil makes up 50% of Russia’s government revenue (Sabitova & Shavaleyeva, 2015), and its price substantially affects the resources that Moscow has available to devote to soft power programs. These financial constraints also affect the talent that Moscow has available to run its soft power institutions. One of the reasons for Konstantin Kovatchev’s resignation from Rossotrudnichestvo, in 2014, was his dissatisfaction with the low levels of funding the agency received (Galimova, 2014). This demonstrates that the Kremlin’s fiscal balance severely limits Russia’s possession of soft power. The effects of budgetary constraints are further amplified by Russian soft power’s characteristics, namely that it is highly centralised and state-led. Russia does possess soft power. However, its soft power resource-effectiveness is tied to the price of oil, which is a historically volatile commodity.
To conclude, Russia possesses ‘limited’ soft power. As outlined above, it is limited for a number of reasons. Firstly, trying to conceptualise Russia’s possession of a western concept, designed for liberal nations, promoting universal values, is never going to fit well. Russia does possess soft power resources; its political and value system is attractive to certain groups. However, due to Russia’s particular conception of soft power, giving primacy to the state, its soft power influence is always going to be tied to the government budget, of which 50% comes from the sale of oil. This means that Russian soft power influence is dependent on the price of a historically volatile commodity. Additionally, Russian soft power is limited geographically to the post-Soviet space and Europe. Even within this geographic space, there are limits as to which sections of society will be receptive to Russian soft power. For example, elites in the post-Soviet space, Russian diaspora and right-wing Europeans are all receptive audiences.
References:
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