How Mario Draghi is Reinventing Italian Foreign Policy

Going into 2021, Italy was on the verge of becoming a pariah within the European Union (EU). Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte’s government was widely seen as an untrustworthy and unstable partner led by populist politicians who lambasted the European project while flirting with autocrats in Moscow and Beijing. However, less than four months into the national unity government of Prime Minister Mario Draghi, Italy appears to have reversed course. Not only has Draghi’s government repaired its relations with key allies in Paris and Berlin, and recommitted Rome to the principles of multilateralism, but it is increasingly setting Europe’s agenda as the EU seeks to emerge from the Covid-19 pandemic.

Renewed Multilateralism

Italian foreign policy traditionally rested on two pillars in the decades after World War II: Europe and the transatlantic relationship with the United States. Washington was Italy’s partner of first resort, while participation in the European project provided Rome with diplomatic cover and amplified Italy’s influence abroad.

That started to change in the late 1990s. Beginning with the sovereigntist leadership of former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, Italians developed a growing tendency to blame Brussels for their country’s myriad problems. Whether with regards to the migrant crisis or high unemployment rates, the EU became an easy scapegoat for Italy’s politicians. This growing Euroscepticism led many Italian governments to invest less energy into working through Brussels and develop closer relations with powers like Russia and China. All that was epitomized in March 2019 when Conte’s government announced that Italy would join China’s Belt and Road Initiative, a move that raised concerns among many of Rome’s Western allies. In an increasingly competitive and multipolar world, it appeared that Italy simply did not value the European unity and multilateral cooperation as much as it once had.

However, Draghi’s leadership appears to have reversed these trends. From the beginning of his tenure, the Italian Prime Minister sought to bring Italy back into the pro-EU, Atlanticist fold. In his inaugural speech, Draghi stressed the centrality of European and transatlantic relations to Italian political and economic interests. He also set out his opposition to the growing authoritarian tendencies of countries like Russia, China, and Turkey.

Draghi has backed up his rhetoric with action. This is particularly true with regards to the pandemic. Rome is no longer turning to Moscow and Beijing for assistance. Instead, Draghi has chosen to work through the EU, as well as institutions like the G7 and the G20, to coordinate vaccine distribution and vaccine exports. In other areas, as well, the new government in Rome has taken important steps. In March 2021, it decided to block an Italian telecommunications company from acquiring 5G components and professional support from ZTE and Huawei—firms frequently accused of spying for Beijing.

This turn back towards Europe and multilateralism is fueled not by some idealistic faith in international cooperation, but by Italy’s interests. In 2019 Italy exported goods and services worth €585 billion, and recorded a trade surplus of more than €50 billion. The top destinations for Italian exports are Germany and France, followed by the United States, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, with China only in ninth place.

Italy’s economic interests are therefore firmly tied to Europe and the transatlantic relationship. The Chinese market may be large and alluring, but it cannot compensate for Europe’s highly integrated market. And large-scale infrastructure initiatives like those Beijing has launched in recent years across the globe still cannot match Italy’s deeper financial ties with Western states.

Tending to Old Friendships

Draghi has also repaired relations with two of Italy’s biggest partners in Europe– France and Germany. Under Italy’s previous two governments, both led by Conte, relations with Paris and Berlin were tetchy. Diplomatic rows were common, particularly with France. It was not long ago that a furious Emmanuel Macron recalled his ambassador to Rome after Italy’s Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini held an unauthorized meeting with the Yellow Vest protester group. In Germany as well, Italy was increasingly seen as Eurosceptic and undermining European unity through its dealings with Russia and China.

Draghi’s leadership has changed that. Relations with Paris and Berlin have blossomed under the new government in Rome. The Italian Prime Minister now holds regular calls with Macron, whose relationship with Draghi dates back to when the Italian Prime Minister headed the European Central Bank (ECB) and Macron was France’s Ministry of the Economy, Industry and Digital Affairs. In Berlin as well, Draghi’s first few months have been welcomed as a return by Rome to the heart of European policymaking.

Leading Europe

But Draghi has not simply made Italy more multilateralist and European. He has also instilled a new sense of activism into Italian foreign policy. Having previously served as the head of the ECB, Draghi came into office with a strong reputation as a staunch Europeanist. He appears to have taken advantage of his credibility and has begun to assert a degree of Italian leadership in the EU that has become increasingly rare in recent years.

In February, the Italian Prime Minister surprised many by becoming the first EU leader to block the export of vaccines outside the EU. The risky move, as tensions between the UK and the European Commission were flaring over vaccine supplies, was quickly supported by several European capitals. It also provided political cover for Commission president Ursula von der Leyen to call for stronger controls on vaccine exports. Soon after, following a diplomatic incident in Ankara where von der Leyen was embarrassed by being left standing without a chair at a summit with Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Draghi stepped up again. While other EU leaders kept quiet, the Italian Prime Minister chastised Erdogan and referred to him as a “dictator.”  While prompting anger in Turkey, the move also deflected focus from the EU’s diplomatic mishap.

Although Draghi has only been in office for a few months, his impact on Italy’s foreign policy has been significant. Draghi’s effectiveness on the management of Italy’s eventual emergence from the pandemic remains to be seen. However, the preliminary evidence seems encouraging.

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