How the Pandemic Undermined US Hegemony in Asia-Pacific: The COVID-19 Vaccine War and the South China Sea
The BRICS summit on 17 November 2020, opened an arena for emerging power’s to cooperate on COVID-19 vaccines. Russia called for an alliance in the mass production and the use of its vaccine, Sputnik V, while China promised to provide its own. These behaviours indicate that while the US is suffering from its pandemic crises, Russia and China are attempting to expand their influence through vaccine diplomacy. This trend raises questions concerning whether the development of the vaccine has transitioned into a competition for hegemony.
This article contends that the COVID-19 vaccine race represents an attempt at power maximization between the great powers. The pandemic has undermined the United States’ military capabilities, meaning that vaccine development has become the most significant way of regenerating military pre-eminence and an opportunity to achieve hegemony. This paper will discuss offensive realism to explain the role of the vaccine race in the United States’ competition for hegemony, focusing on the naval rivalry between the US and China and in the South China Sea. It will suggest how vaccine development contributes to these states’ attempts at power maximization. The essay will evaluate the argument using liberal institutionalism and conclude with a prediction about the future of the vaccine race.
Offensive Realism
Waltz’s structural realism is the cornerstone of modern international relations theory. It describes states as the primary rational actors, suggesting that they seek power and security to survive in the anarchical international system. Offensive realists, although agreeing with these assumptions, claim that Waltz’s theory encompasses a status quo bias, which describes states as only seeking to maintain the existing balance of power, thus theoretically limiting the range of power that they desire. Mearsheimer argues that these explanations disregard all states’ revisionist and expansionist characteristics.
Offensive realists, therefore, claim that states maintain offensive military intentions, and that their perception of the most secure environment is one in which they maximize their relative power over others and become a hegemon. Hence, a states’ desire for power is insatiable, making every state revisionist – there are no status quo powers. Even the hegemon seeks more power to constrain the potential competitor. Thus, cooperation is difficult – states fear the possibility of cheating and unequal gains, and alliances are only created temporarily as a means to check the power of a potential hegemon. Moreover, as international institutions do not possess any independent power, but merely reflect the states’ interests, they are ineffective at curtailing hegemonic power. Schweller claimed that “institutions cannot be both autonomous from the hegemon’s power and interests, and capable of checking its exercise of power.”
Yet, what is the definition of ‘power’ according to offensive realism? Mearsheimer divides national power into ‘military’ and ‘latent’. Despite the greater emphasis on military power, offensive realists agree on states’ primary pursuit of latent power – the socio-economic ingredients that build military power. Gilpin claimed, “the interests of individual actors and the balance of power among the actors, change as a result of economic, technological and other developments”, contributing to the growth of latent power. Zakaria argued that states expand their influence abroad when the decision-makers perceive a relative increase in the state power – the state’s capability to convert wealth into military power. This relationship between the military and latent power can be observed in the COVID-19 vaccine race.
The Vaccine Race and the South China Sea
Despite international cooperation against the virus, vaccine development suggests a new era of competition. Russia first approved its vaccine, China is under the final trials for its five vaccine candidates, and the US has approved the vaccines from Pfizer and Moderna. This competition conforms with offensive realism. The pandemic has hampered the power of states globally, causing a drive to maximize latent power in order to rehabilitate its military counterpart.
The pandemic’s impact on the military is visible in the US-China naval competition in the South China Sea. The US and China have been competing for dominance over this strategically important ocean, which carries 21% of global sea trade and plays host to ongoing territorial disputes between China and the Southeast Asian states. China asserts historical claims within the ‘nine-dash line,’ which is included in its Anti-access, Area Denial policy (A2/AD), aiming to expel the US and expand towards the Western Pacific. The US, in response, has been conducting a ‘Freedom of Navigation Operation (FONOP),’ which seeks to constrain China through maintaining a naval presence near the disputed islands. Buszynski argued that China’s naval expansion might force the exclusion of the US from the Western Pacific, which motivates its naval presence in the South China Sea.
The pandemic, however, has weakened the US navy, as seen in the case of the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt of the Pacific Fleet. After confirming the first case of COVID-19 onboard in March, the Roosevelt was sidelined from its mission in the South China Sea. It was anchored in Guam, and 1,271 out of 5,000 crew members tested positive. The exclusion of the Roosevelt, thus, decreased the US’s naval power, offering China an opportunity to expand. China has been sending increasing numbers of surveillance ships and naval fleets for military drills. China also launched DF-21 and DF-26, known as ‘aircraft-carrier killer’ missiles, in November, which struck near the Paracel Islands.
Moreover, China is using the vaccines to expand its leverage over its Southeast Asian neighbours in the territorial dispute. Chinese Premier Li Keqiang offered priority access to its vaccines to five Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) members, including Vietnam, and it signed an agreement with Malaysia to provide the vaccine. These behaviors indicate China’s expansionist intentions. Mearsheimer predicted, “a wealthy China would not be a status quo power, but an aggressive state determined to achieve regional hegemony.” The pandemic’s impact on the US military and the increase in China’s latent power through the vaccine, have helped Beijing to expand its power and influence abroad. The vaccine race is, therefore, emblematic of the great powers’ competition for hegemony amid the pandemic, and more generally.
Liberal Institutionalist’s Claims
Offensive realism, nevertheless, neglects global cooperation in vaccine development facilitated by international institutions. Keohane and Martin argued that relative gains make international institutions more significant because they “alleviate fears of unequal gains from cooperation.” For instance, 62 states, including the G7 and G20, have pledged to contribute US$8.8 billion to the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization’s (GAVI) global plan for the fair distribution of the COVID-19 vaccine (COVAX). The US and China also opened virtual talks between their militaries to discuss their pandemic prevention plans. These examples contradict offensive realism’s prediction that the relative gains and possibility of cheating hinders cooperation. Rather, these institutions promote reciprocity for fair access to the vaccines, enabling further cooperation.
Nonetheless, the great powers’ interests were also reflected in these international institutions. The failure to prevent the pandemic undermined Western liberal democracies’ leadership and expanded the emerging powers’ influence in the institutions. For instance, the US declared its withdrawal from the World Health Organization (WHO), accusing it of delaying its declaration of the international emergency under pressure from Beijing. The growth of Chinese power was reflected in the approach of international institutions, which no longer bowed to US interests.
Conclusion
The space race between the US and the Soviet Union in the 1960s, represented the competition for nuclear missile technology. The vaccine race resembles this competition – not only in terms of medical technology, but also with regard to the support latent power provides to military power and influence abroad. The US’s public health crises impeded its military capabilities, while China’s vaccine diplomacy and the maritime expansion amid the pandemic demonstrate hegemonic competition. Thus, the vaccine race embodies the political pursuit of power maximization. If China achieves victory, the US military may become dependent on Chinese vaccines, undermining the US hegemony and allowing China’s rise. However, if the US immunizes its military successfully, then its hegemony can be preserved and it could use the vaccines to form a coalition tilted against China.
Offensive realism, by contrast, has a strong emphasis on military power, limiting its applicability to the vaccine race. For instance, the US continued its military campaigns in the South China Sea, even after the outbreak of COVID-19 on its naval vessels. Fravel argued that China used force in territorial disputes when its bargaining power decreased. China’s assertive military policies, therefore, can be seen as a response to increasing US naval presence in the region, rather than as evidence of an attempt to expand its influence. These behaviours suggest the pandemic’s minimal impact on the military and that the vaccine race is an independent phenomenon, irrelevant to the state’s power maximization.
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