Immigration or Fragmentation: The Future of the EU may rest on its Response to a New Wave of Immigration
When, in AD376, the Goths crossed the Danube to demand citizenship in the Roman Empire, the Eastern Roman Emperor, Valens, considered the request to be the nth proof of Rome’s overwhelming greatness. The empire was famous for negotiating the entrance of foreigners, posing two primary rules: the only preserved right of the foreigners was not to be turned into slaves, and the emperor had the power to decide how to employ the new “migrants” (Barbero, 2020). Little did the Romans of the time know, those migratory movements would prove crucial for the fate of the Western Roman Empire. At the Battle of Adrianople in AD378, predominantly the product of failing integration strategies, the victory of the Gothic army heralded the beginning of the end for the Western Roman empire. Some 1,800 years later, migration remains a heavily polarizing phenomenon, both politically and socially, and the EU does not seem ready to build a solid integration process.
EU Competences and Proposals
In absolute terms, Europe has never experienced the levels of inward migration it did between 2015 and 2016. In those two years, more than 2,300,000 irregular crossings were detected by Frontex (Europarl, 2021). These numbers fed a conservative narrative that dramatically pushed a part of the European electorate towards Eurosceptic movements as a result of an alleged cultural and social threat. The lack of burden-sharing regulations was utilized in multiple elections by domestic leaders to reiterate Europe’s governance vacuum in terms of defending member states. The 2019 European elections saw the triumph of Matteo Salvini, who reached over 34% with the slogan “Italians first”. Marine Le Pen in France battled for what would have been a historic win for the presidency. Sebastian Kurz in Austria became chancellor with a conservative and anti-immigrant narrative. Orban in Hungary and Morawiecki in Poland refused to back a redistribution plan and depicted such requests as EU diktats that menaced their culture, identity and sovereignty (ISPI). The rise of Euroscepticism was strictly linked to migration.
Ironically though, immigration is still a competence under Justice and Home Affairs that resides under domestic sovereignty. This means that states chose, and still purposedly choose, to keep competence on immigration, though frequently accusing EU institutions of incapacity or unfair treatment. Even though the EU significantly increased its funding for migration, asylum and integration process after 2015 (EUR 22.7 billion in the 2021-2027 budget compared to the EUR 10 billion in the 2014-2020) its scope of action on the topic remains limited.
As was expected, the Mediterranean migratory path rose in popularity with the loosening of Covid-19 restrictions and the approach of summer (calmer waters and easier crossings). Between the 1st of January and the 12th of May, 12,894 people arrived in Italy but over 500 died on the crossing (Ispi, 2021). At the moment, EU member states are waiting for the approval of a New Pact on Migration and Asylum that was proposed by the Commission on 23rd September 2020 (Ec. Europa, 2020). The proposed pact to transition from the Dublin Convention sets out three different dimensions. The first is the external dimension, which aims at consolidating accords with neighbouring countries through finances directed at control of immigration and the development of infrastructures. Secondly, the EU aims to strengthen a European service at the borders to improve screening, identification and welcoming infrastructures. In this, there is also rapid repatriation for individuals who are not allowed in Europe. The third phase is the proposal of sponsored repatriations. Therefore, instead of discussing redistribution and numbers, the Commission proposes that those countries that refuse to welcome refugees shall themselves finance the process of repatriation. However, these proposals fail to account for the evolution of migration as a burden-sharing mechanism.
Geo-Political Challenges to EU Sovereignty: Turkey in MENA
At the Conference of Europe on 9th May in Porto, the migration question was faced with no results. A redistribution plan has already been blocked by the Austrian Minister of the EU, Karoline Edstadler, while the lack of a united European response to migration and foreign policy allowed the involvement of actors like Turkey and Russia in the Mediterranean arena. The diplomatic relations with Moscow and Ankara are far from being relaxed. The sofa-gate, Draghi’s definition of Erdogan as a “dictator”, and the ban of the President of the EP, David Sassoli, from Russia, due to the protests concerning Navalny, highlights the tensions “bordering” the EU.
It may therefore sound unsurprising that the Italian Minister of the Interior, Luciana Lamorgese, indirectly suggested geopolitical interests behind the new arrivals coming to Italy and Spain (Tito, 2021). The new migrant wave might be a product of an expansionist strategy especially of the Turkish President, Erdogan. EU-Turkey relations are heavily based on the control of migrants – especially after 2015 when Ankara received significant financial support from Brussels (6 billion euros) to stem the flow of migrants coming via the Balkans (essentially keep refugees out of EU territory).
Erdogan has increased his influence in Libya. Parts of the country, like the Port of Misurata, passed into Turkish sovereignty (for the next 99 years) in exchange for political and military aid (Colombo, 2020). This geo-political consolidation in Libya provides Ankara with double leverage on the EU. Firstly, it provides Ankara with almost complete control of immigration (from the Mediterranean and Balkan routes). Secondly, it heightens competition in terms of natural resources. The Eastern part of the Mediterranean has been bolstered by gas findings between Egypt, Cyprus and Israel. Egypt, especially, may become a strategic player in the exportation of gas in the Mediterranean given that it may be able to fulfil its gas requirements with the finding of only one deposit – Zohr. This feeds the plan of the EastMed pipeline, an infrastructure project with a capacity of 10bcm, able to transport the gas from the Mediterranean to Greece and then to Italy, therefore by-passing Turkey and decreasing dependency on Russia (Colombo, 2020). Preliminary agreements already occurred between Greece, Israel and Cyprus.
At the moment Turkey is the connector between Middle Eastern producers and European consumers, a role that, in case of fulfilment of the EastMed, may be taken by Greece. Erdogan’s interest, therefore, seems to have two main focal points: firstly, maintaining political instability in Libya, to keep the EU under check in terms of immigration control. Secondly, working towards becoming an integral part of the EastMed project, by claiming certain maritime territories and pushing Libya to do the same (Santoro, 2021).
Internal Challenges: will the new migration wave fragment Europe?
Aside from exogenous geopolitical conditions, the EU will increasingly be challenged by internal issues. The Malta agreement of 2019, which focused on redistribution by some states on a voluntary basis, was heavily supported by France and Germany. These are two states that, when facing future elections, will be unlikely to take risks on topics sensitive to the electorate, like immigration. The end of the Merkel-era in September, and the upcoming French Presidential elections in 2022, see a possible change to the driving Franco-German axis. Le Pen’s position has been improving in the polls. Furthermore, a group of serving French soldiers has recently published a letter warning of the possibility of civil unrest given the concessions given by Macron’s government to Islamic communities (Rivais et al, 2021). It is unlikely, at such a delicate time, that either of the two players will actively promote a burden mechanism in migratory accords given the social sensibility of the topic.
Marco Galluzzo from Corriere Della Sera (2021) reported on 11th May 2021, that between 50-70,000 individuals are ready to flee to Europe from the Libyan coast. The past refugee crisis encouraged a clear shift away from pro-European parties throughout the continent. It is thus evident that a new wave of migration may drive the electorate towards Euroscepticism in a crucial moment for the future of the EU. It is under these assumptions that supranational institutions will increasingly need to promote transparent actions to tackle immigration while remaining as united as possible with third actors like Turkey, Russia or China. In the last month the conflict between David Sassoli (president of the EP) and Putin, and the annulment of the EU-China Comprehensive agreement due to oppression of Muslims in Xinjiang, showed that Brussels is determined to become an independent and influential global norm setter (de la Baumia et al 2021).
For migration, the EU needs to step up its burden-sharing mechanism, condemning and opposing any disrespect of human rights or rule of law. An incoherent response to the inevitable new wave of immigrants will be utilized by domestic Eurosceptics and third actors like Turkey to increase their support by fragmenting the European Union – a socio-political fragmentation that might represent the final coup de grace to the transition towards a politically united Europe. The EU is not an empire. Contemporary immigrants and refugees are not Goths. But an indecisive strategy on migration might likely imply a political division fatal to the growth of the EU as a global geopolitical actor.
References
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