Neopatrimonialism as the Limit to Current Reforms in Uzbekistan

In the four years since Shavkat Mirziyoyev succeeded Islam Karimov as President, Uzbekistan has experienced unprecedented changes which opened discussions about the possible democratization of the state. Indeed, the Economist labelled Uzbekistan ‘The country of the year, 2019’, the international media talk about Uzbekistan as an ‘Uzbek miracle’ and President Mirziyoyev is often described as a reformer or a liberal.

It is undeniable that he has implemented numerous positive changes. Nevertheless, uncritical praising of his persona might be premature.  Working as a prime minister under Islam Karimov, Mirziyoyev is still a controversial figure. During the Majlis podcast interview from September 2020, Alisher Sidik, the director of RFE/RL Uzbek service, pointed out that corruption in the state occurs ‘in a scale unheard of”.

This article will therefore argue that Uzbekistan remains in a neopatrimonial framework as informal social-exchange practices are still being used to influence decision-making today. These practices, typical of neopatrimonialism, are holding back the current reformist agenda and preventing deeper structural change.

After introducing the concept of neopatrimonialism, this article will link it with practices of nepotism, cronyism, clientelism, and corruption. In the second part, it will briefly describe the neopatrimonial regime of Islam Karimov and reforms of president Mirziyoyev. Finally, this piece will demonstrate the existence of these practices through several recent examples and explain how they undermine Mirziyoyev’s reformist rhetoric.

Neopatrimonialism and its Practices 

The term neopatrimonialism has been extensively discussed by many academics, most notably by scholars examining authoritarian regimes in Africa such as Dominique van de Walle (2007). Some commentators, however, use neopatrimonialism to explain the durability of authoritarian regimes in the post-Soviet space. For example, Pavel Skigin (2017) applies neopatrimonial optics to Putin’s Russia, while Hans van Zon (2005) uses neopatrimonialism to explain the regime of Leonid Kuchma in Ukraine and Oleksandr Fisun (2019) focuses on neopatrimonialism in a broader context concerning post-communist Eurasia.

For Central Asian scholars, neopatrimonialism proved to be a fruitful concept to describe the authoritarian governance of states in Central Asia. Yet, it is also a concept that is widely contested and debated, mainly due to its breadth. Erdmann and Engel argued, for instance, that neopatrimonialism is in danger of becoming a ‘catch-all’ concept due to the absence of a clear definition.

According to Erdmann and Engel (2007), ‘neopatrimonialism refers to a system of governance where patrons and clients exchange rents for loyalty (as in archetypical Weberian patrimonial society) but existing with the legal framework of a rational bureaucratic structure’.

With the perception of neopatrimonialism as a system of governance based on an exchange of rent and loyalty, there is another question to ask. What is the relationship between neopatrimonialism and concepts based on a social exchange such as cronyism, nepotism, clientelism and corruption?

Firstly, it is important to find clear definitions of these concepts. Bratton and van de Walle (1997) defined clientelism as an exchange of favours – on a state level typically in the form of public sector jobs – for loyalty. Nepotism and cronyism may be viewed as a narrower version of clientelism, with nepotism being a practice of appointing or employing individuals based on family ties, rather than objective measures such as skills or experience. Cronyism is very similar but is based on friendship. Corruption, as defined by Transparency International, is a broader concept that may serve as a subordinate term to the three concepts mentioned above. They define it as ‘the abuse of entrusted power for private gain.’

There is no agreement about the relationship between neopatrimonialism and these concepts in academic literature. While Médard (1998) argues that neopatrimonialism and clientelism are two competing models, Eisendstad (1973) claims that these two are intertwined.

Some authors perceive neopatrimonialism as a synonym for corruption, nepotism, cronyism or clientelism. Laruelle (2012) on the other hand, sees differences between these. Corruption, for example, is an economic phenomenon that can be decentralized and non-politicized. Neopatrimonialism, however, supposes a ‘centralized and hierarchical corruption that operates in a pyramidal fashion, and serves a political legitimacy strategy’. She thus indicates that corruption is a component of neopatrimonialism.

Similarly, Bratton and van de Walle (1997) see corruption and clientelism as institutions of neopatrimonialism. Korte (2011) perceives corruption and nepotism as a practice of neopatrimonialism, while Erdman and Engel (2007) regard nepotism, corruption, cronyism and clientelism as constitutive elements, or rather politics of a neopatrimonial state.

Thus, I will utilise Erdman and Engel’s definition of neopatrimonialism and their understanding of nepotism, corruption, cronyism and clientelism as constitutive elements, or as I will call it – practices. This will allow me to analyse these processes and determine whether Mirziyoyev’s regime continues to operate within a neopatrimonial framework.

Rule of Islam Karimov 

In Uzbekistan, reliance on informal power through patron-client relation is often connected to the regime of Islam Karimov, yet a neopatrimonial style of rule was nurtured already by Soviet officials, most notably by Stalin and Brezhnev. Brezhnev consolidated the bureaucratic class on both central and local levels which inspired Uzbek leader Sharaf Rashidov, who managed to build a cadre patron-client network (Ilkhamov, 2007).

When Karimov came to power, he gave amnesty to many officials who were incarcerated for their connection to Moscow’s anti-corruption campaign in the late 1980s. These officials who were also representatives of regional patron-client networks, were given essential positions in the government (Ilkhamov, 2007). A good example is a member of Samarkand’s patron-client network, Ismail Jurabekov, who was appointed as deputy prime minister. He was forced to resign in 1999 but was reappointed later that year after explosions that were supposed to assassinate Islam Karimov. Jurabekov was dismissed again in 2004 (Saidazimova, 2005).

The political destiny of Jurabekov demonstrates Karimov’s consolidation path as, right after he managed to consolidate his personal power, he started to eliminate the “old” regional patron-client network (in academic literature often labelled clans) leaders (Ilkamov, 2007). This allowed him to remove the neopatrimonial system, but instead he began to facilitate the emergence of a new patron-client network around key administrative departments. Journalists reported mainly about a struggle between National Security Council (SNB), led by Rustam Inoyatov, and the Ministry of Interior (MVD) headed by Zakir Almatov – these institutions were also believed to be the two main pillars of Karimov’s regime (Saidazimova, 2005).

The two bodies had well-developed coercive power, barely checked by the regime, but they also acquired control over some economic activities. According to Ilkhamov (2012), neither of them was checked by Islam Karimov as he viewed their economic income as a reward for their loyalty.

At the same time, he retained control over local politics as local governors (hokims) were appointed and directly accountable to the president. The case of hokims illustrates the blurred lines between formal and informal politics, typical of neopatrimonialism, as hokims are formal political bodies but were often appointed due to their patron-client relationship with the president.

The regime of Islam Karimov was also widely connected with cronyism and nepotism according to the International Crisis Group (2016).  His daughter, Gulnara, proved to be particularly controversial. Ilkhamov (2007) claims she played a key role in the creation of what he calls ‘mega clan’ – a formation around the presidential family.  Having ownership of a business and extensive patronage network, she facilitated the economic growth of this mega clan with the support of the administrative machine controlled by Karimov. One example of Karimova’s involvement in political decisions was an affair around Swedish telecom giant TeliaSonera. Karimova required bribes in exchange for entry to the Uzbek market (Sindelar, 2013).

Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s Reforms 

Shavkat Mirziyoyev came to power in September 2016 as a former prime minister of Karimov’s government. After the initial scepticism on the part of international observers, he very soon proved that his presidency will be different from those of his predecessors. Just months into his presidency, he presented a reform strategy for 2017- 2021 with five areas of priority: improvement of construction of the state and society, ensuring the role of law and judicial and legal reform, development and liberalisation of the economy, development of the social sphere, ensuring security and harmony between various national groups and religious tolerance, and the implementation of a sustainable and constructive foreign policy (Marszewski, 2018).

One of the most important goals of the strategy was the liberalisation of the economy. Later in 2017 therefore, he issued a decree that removed artificial restrictions on foreign trade, liberalized currency policy or reduced custom duties on more than 8000 categories of imported goods. He also sought to allure foreign investors into the country. Hence, in April 2019, he started with a privatization plan to further attract foreign investments, according to Kosta Law Firm (2019).

Furthermore, Mirziyoyev significantly reduced forced labour and completely eliminated child forced labour, however, according to reports there are still significant numbers of people being forced to work in the cotton fields. Mirziyoyev also released numerous political prisoners, closed Jaslyk prison – infamous centre of Uzbekistan’s torture practices – and lifted bans on several websites. Yet, at the same time, human rights remain restricted, especially in terms of political or religious freedoms according to the Human Rights Watch (2019).

The limits of political freedoms were apparent during the elections in December 2019. Even though Mirziyoyev adopted ‘some changes’ to its Electoral Code in February, according to HRW ‘the reform was not enough to allow voters a genuine choice of candidates in the 2019 elections’.

Finally, in 2020, Mirziyoyev established the ‘Anti-Corruption Agency’ accountable to the chambers of the parliament (Kun, 2020). This was another step taken by the government to fight corruption, after they approved a ‘State Anti-Corruption Program’ in 2017 (Salomov, 2019). In the first half of 2017, they initiated more than 1566 cases with the most popular anti-corruption case regarding the daughter of Islam Karimov, Gulnara, who was sentenced to 10 years of prison (Lemon, 2019).

However, although the reforms brought about many positive changes, some authors remain cautious and argue that Mirziyoyev is not changing the system but is rather adjusting it to his needs by using similar practices to his predecessor. For example, Zakirov (2020) points to prevalent neopatrimonialism when claiming that ‘the backbone of political survival is sustained by an informal arrangement whereby Mirziyoyev provides networks patronage, wealth in government positions and economic sectors in exchange for their political support and loyalty.’ Similarly, Professor Kristian Lasslet (2020) argues that the legacy of corruption and client-patron relationships have a severe impact on present reforms. Kate Mallinson (2019), Edward Lemon (2019), Paul Stronski (2020) and Adam Hug (2020) point out that Mirziyoyev is using similar neopatrimonial practices as his predecessor.

I will now describe several recent issues based on investigative articles and academic reports that prove the prevalence of neopatrimonial practices in the regime of Shavkat Mirziyoyev.

Neopatrimonial Practices in Mirziyoyev’s Regime

Security Services 

When Islam Karimov died, there were three names mentioned in the discussion about his potential successor –Shavkat Mirziyoyev, Finance Minister Rustam Azimov, and Security Chief Rustam Inoyatov. The latter two enjoyed significant power and were thus perceived as dangerous rivals to the president. Therefore, the day after his inauguration, Mirziyoyev removed Rustam Azimov from his position of Finance Minister (Pannier, 2018).

Rustam Inoyatov was more difficult to eliminate as the State Security Service – SNB – (over which he presided) had always held a very strong position in the country after serving as an enforcement body of Islam Karimov’s regime. Inoyatov opposed Mirziyoyev’s reforms and SNB often blocked their implementation. This gave Mirziyoyev a strong argument for why the SNB should be restructured. Mirziyoyev managed to dismiss Inoyatov in 2018. This moment is often cited as a key point for Mirziyoyev’s power consolidation (Chatham House, 2018).

Having dismissed his potential rivals, Mirziyoyev started to build his own network of loyal people. Currently, the country’s most important institution seems to be the National Guard that was formed in 1992 and which had always been a part of National Security Forces but in 2017, Mirziyoyev issued a decree that granted it independence.  Since then, Mirziyoyev has been increasing its powers. Currently, it is, among other things, responsible for the ‘protection and defence of objects of state importance. It can conduct pre-trial investigations, detain people, bring them to a National Guard branch, and hold them.’ Radio Free Europe reported that the National Guard participated in the dispersion and detention of protesters during protests in Khorezm Province in summer 2019 (Pannier, 2019).

According to Eurasianet, Mirziyoyev distributed posts in the National Guard to dependable guard hardliners and those who are loyal to him, well-illustrated by the appointment of the head of the National Guard and his deputy. The Head of National Guard was reserved for Bahodir Tashmatov, trusted former deputy defence minister and Andijan veteran. In 2020, he was replaced by Rustam Dzhuraev, also a senior official from the Islam Karimov era (Gazeta.uz, 2020). His deputy is Batyr Tursunov, father of Oybek Tursunov, who is married to Saida Mirziyoeva, the president’s eldest daughter (Pannier, 2019).

Batyr Tursunov is not the only family member who occupies a key position. His son also enjoys a particularly important position as deputy head of the presidential administration. His youngest daughter currently works as deputy head of the Department for Preschool Educational Institutions at the Ministry of Education (Lemon, 2019).

The case of the National Guards illustrates the efforts of Shavkat Mirziyoyev to disrupt the informal network created by Islam Karimov (with Rustam Inoyatov as a key figure) and to replace it with one of his own. To ensure loyalty, the places were granted to several high-ranking officials from Karimov’s period. As security services have always played a prominent role, it seems reasonable to perceive the appointment of the heads of National Security Services as a case of clientelism. Furthermore, this case proves that Mirziyoyev uses nepotism as a practice to ensure loyalty.

Sordoba Dam, Tashkent City Project, and Privatization Clusters 

The Sordoba dam failure, which left at least four dead and drove around 90 000 people out of their houses, raises questions about a use of informal practices. Days after the collapse, Mirziyoyev announced the establishment of a commission that should investigate the circumstances that led to the disaster. One member of the commission, senator Abdugani Sanginov, proved to be a particularly questionable figure as he was closely involved in the construction of the dam through a private company owned by him.

The investigative commission was given one month to submit its conclusion but, according to The Economist, no reports came to fruition after three months of investigation, and it will take another five months to complete it. From its preliminary findings, nine people have been arrested. Yet, no senior bureaucrats or businessmen appear to be among them.

An investigative report by the Uzbek Service of Radio: Free Europe revealed that Mirziyoyev and Sanginov are close friends from the time they were studying at University. Further investigation was, however, halted by harassment of journalist by state officials.

This is not the only case of a high state official being involved in dubious affairs. One of the major issues connected to the governance of Shavkat Mirziyoyev is property development in Tashkent. The project, which consists of residential complexes, hotels, business centres and a Congress Centre is promoted as a symbol of a modern and open Uzbekistan. Shavkat Mirziyoyev even issued a decree under which investors were exempt from paying customs or taxes (Lasslett, 2020).

However, no public and transparent tender took place, and the investors were chosen by an Administrative Council consisting of several high-ranking state officials including the Prime Minister and Mayor of Tashkent. One of the investors, Akfa-Artel was allegedly founded by the Mayor of Tashkent, Jahongir Artikhodjayev, who is also directly responsible for the implementation of the project (Lemon, 2020).

There are more controversies with the construction. The Open Democracy exposé, for example, revealed that people living in the area where the construction was based, were forced out from their homes without financial compensation (Akhmedov, 2020). Moreover, Artikhodjayev used abusive behaviour to prevent journalists from investigating the project (Lasslett, 2020).

Comparable issues can be found in the case of the privatization of agriculture, especially cotton plantations, which is being carried out through a cluster system. These clusters were, however, also established without competitive and transparent tenders. Radio Free Europe journalists even stressed that ‘there are unconfirmed allegations that some cluster owners have links to senior officials in Tashkent – including relatives of Mirziyoyev in his native region of Jizzakh.’ (Synovitz and Ashur 2019).

These three have one thing in common – all the chosen companies (or clusters) won without a transparent tender. The cases of Sordoba Dam and Tashkent City are especially controversial as senior public officials have been connected to the constructions. There are many indications of corruption on the part of the mayor and since the president has not taken any steps to remove him or to limit his economic activities, it can be argued that there may be a clientelist relationship between these two. This claim may be supported by the fact that the position of the Tashkent mayor is especially important and thus it is in the president’s interest to guarantee his loyalty.

With regards to the senator, Sanginov, there is information about his personal connection to the president and thus, the possibility of cronyism. Similarly, if the allegations of Radio Free Europe were proven to be true, it would indicate the use of cronyism in the privatization of agriculture as well.

Hokims

In 2017, the government passed an amendment of a law which granted the right to elect the hokims to local parliaments but with the approval of the president. As Andrea Schmitz (2020) points out ‘in the absence of effective checks and balances it is still the president who decides’.

Hokims, by law, bestow several responsibilities ranging from the safety and security of the population to the oversight of economic, social, cultural, fiscal, utility, and environmental matters (Hashimova, 2018). The Uzbek media website Kun.uz(2019) reported that although they are officially accountable to the local parliament, hokims ‘are the only figures that decide everything.’ Andrea Schmitz adds that their responsibilities were even increased under Mirziyoyev as they were given the task of implementing the governmental reforms on their territories.

Hokims are often criticized for being too slow in the implementation of the reforms as well as for their human rights abuses. Many of them were replaced for these reasons, such as, Nosirjon Egamberdiev who was dismissed for striking his district school principals (Hashimova, 2019).

However, while some of the hokims are being replaced, many hold onto their position for a lengthy period of time. An example of this is the leader of Sokh exclave Shukhrat Ganiev who was appointed to the role of governor in 2011 during the rule of Islam Karimov and is known for being a violent and hot-tempered figure. Recently, he detained a YouTube blogger who filmed a video in which he lamented about Ganiev’s practices. Yet, although Mirziyoyev distanced himself from Ganiev’s behaviour, he has not dismissed him (Pannier, 2020).

Similarly, Zoyir Mirzaev, former deputy Prime Minister, was fired for ‘serious shortcomings’ after investigative reports proved that he forced workers to stand in a water-filled ditch as a punishment for not meeting the cotton-picking quotas. In 2019, he was reappointed as the governor of Uzbekistan’s southern Kashkadarya Province (Pannier, 2019b).

These cases provoke questions as to why some of the hokims are being removed while others enjoy their positions even if they are proved to be slow in reform implementation or to be of an abusive and violent nature. One of the possible explanations of this is an informal relationship between the president and hokims. Adam Hug (2020) states that there are signs ‘that personal loyalty to the President is the primary requirement for the job.’

The Limits

Although it would require broader research to evaluate to which level Mirziyoyev’s Uzbekistan is neopatrimonial, it is clear that the neopatrimonial practices are still eminent and thus the regime remains in a neopatrimonial framework.

Adam Hug (2020) claims that the new economic reforms generate more opportunities for these practices. This proved to be true in the case of Tashkent City project or privatization of agriculture. Edward Lemon (2020) claims that the economic liberalization will bring benefits mainly to the country’s elite ‘who continue to capture benefits through their patronage networks.’

Another problem in this regard is that informal practices may discourage foreign investors from engaging in Uzbek projects. Kate Mallinson (2019) states that although Uzbekistan recorded an increase in foreign direct investments, the country is not receiving enough investments to cover its needs. Similarly, Bhutia (2019), basing his arguments on IMF data, claims that FDI has not registered a notable increase despite Mirziyoyev’s reform.

Furthermore, the elite established in the patron-client relations is likely to be blocking some reforms or their implementation. Kate Mallinson (2019), for example, points out that ‘opposition within the government to the implementation of some of the reforms, as well as competing government interests, have led to backtracking on some reforms.’ Also, the case of hokims, examined earlier, is yet another example of how reform-implementation can be tricky, particularly on the regional level.

Most notably, however, this prevalence of neopatrimonial practices and patron-client relationships between the elite and president shows that Mirziyoyev is not trying to change the system and transform the authoritarian style of ruling into democracy as he claims. Paul Stronski, for example, argues that the government is not seeking a democracy but rather economic stability (Stronski, 2020). Bekzod Zakirov, a PhD candidate at the University of Tokyo, claims that the ‘hope that reforms will ultimately bring about free-market capitalism with accompanying democratic politics is utmost naivety’ (Zakirov, 2020), and Edward Lemon (2019) sees Mirziyoyev’s reforms rather as an authoritarian upgrading when claiming that ‘while the system is being modernized, there is little evidence that this will result in political liberalization.’

Mirziyoyev’s goal thus seems to be to remain in power. This may be achieved by keeping influential people close based on patron-client relationship. Even if Mirziyoyev decided to introduce democratic reforms such as the mentioned elections of hokims, the elite would try to prevent it. Democratic changes are undesirable to the national or local elite as it would cost them their current position and other (primarily economic) benefits. Any effort to change this system or impose democratic reforms may thus threaten the president’s main goal– to remain in power.

Moreover, Mirziyoyev claims that his reforms are improving human rights, but in fact, opposing the government is still dangerous, and the new freedoms are limited. This argument can be backed by the cases described above – they illustrate how rent-seekers violate human rights either by attacking journalists and civil activists or by forcing people out of their homes without any compensation. None of the figures mentioned above have been punished for their actions.

Alisher Ilkhamov wrote in 2007 that ‘Uzbekistan stands at the threshold of softening its over-restrictive authoritarian regime, but it is likely to remain within the framework of neopatrimonial rule for the foreseeable future.’ The Regime of Mirziyoyev seems to reflect this prediction perfectly.

Conclusion 

Based on the examples and arguments mentioned above, Mirziyoyev will probably continue in his reforms as well as in his democratic rhetoric, improvement of human rights or bigger civil involvement in policymaking to ensure the regime’s internal and external legitimacy.

However, the informal aspect of his power still proves to be an important part of his rule. This points to the fact that Mirziyoyev is not trying to impose structural changes and transform the state into a democracy. Even if he did, the entrenched neopatrimonial framework would not allow it.  Therefore, we can claim that Uzbek reforms will continue to be imposed and implemented but in the limits of what is still beneficial for the elite and president himself.

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