The Arctic Ocean: an Area of Contention for Influence between Contemporary International Powers
The Arctic Ocean has been making headlines in recent days. On May 20th, 2021 the heads of diplomacy of the member States of the Arctic Council met in Reykjavik, Iceland. This meeting is part of the activities of this Council (Arctic Council Ministerial 20 May 2021). Two days earlier, Russia invited Western media for the first time to visit its Arctic military base on the Franz Josef Archipelago. Described by the Russian army as a strategic base respectful of the Arctic environment, it is the second center of surveillance and military deterrence for this Arctic power.
For his part, Russian foreign minister Lavrov urged Western Arctic Council members to return to the organization of regular meetings of major heads of state of the armies of all Arctic States. This request comes after the Western denunciation of recent Russian military activities in the region. Considering the Russian military presence in the region as legitimate to defend national interests, Lavrov calls NATO’s involvement in the Arctic a threat to Russia’s security (Russia’s State News Agency, RIA Novosti, 2021).
Even if direct confrontations are ruled out for the moment, the internationalization of the Arctic Ocean is largely the product of the glacial disappearance caused by global warming, and indeed the emergence of opportunities for the natural resource’s exploitation, and the extension of maritime routes for the merchant navy. According to US Navy and Marine Corps scientific information released in January 2021, sea ice is melting rapidly, and Arctic water is becoming increasingly accessible to the merchant navy.
In this sense, the United States and its allies, including Canada, are increasingly concerned of the strengthening of Russia’s military presence in the Arctic, and of the attempts of this Arctic power to claim as much maritime territory as possible, and assert full control over navigation in the waters of the Arctic Ocean along its coastline and exclusive economic zone.
Indeed, the Arctic zone is of interest to actors other than the five coastal States. What will be the future of the Arctic with climate change? How do the Arctic States and third States plan to share the prosperity of this region? Such a project could therefore also reveal legal questions about regional integration.
Contemporary strategic issues in the Arctic Ocean
Linked to the image of a remote space not yet explored, as well as to the reputation of being one of the last reserves of economic opportunities on the planet, current discourse on the Arctic is associated to questions of governance, international law, global warming, the rights of indigenous peoples, cooperation, and competition, as well as a committed foreign policy of neighboring States. The Arctic has always been an attractive and mysterious region for all Nations, not only because of the human fascination with the extreme weather conditions, but also, and for the most part, because it has been an integral part of geopolitics and strategic chess games from the mid 17thcentury to the 21stcentury (Young 2016).
With global warming, other reasons have led States to take a close interest in the Arctic Ocean. Activities in this part of the world are being converted; it is no longer a question of exploration; it is more than that (Jarashow 2007).Thus, with the ambiguity of international law on the legal status of these Arctic waters draws the attention of third States in order to have access to them. In addition, third Countries are more involved in Arctic affairs, especially European Union members, China, Japan, Korea, India…
Over the past two decades, several studies have focused on the rise of State interests in the Arctic, including what would be a race to:
-The delimitation of maritime borders and the Arctic Continental Shelf
-International shipping
-Fishing in Arctic waters
-The exploitation of natural resources
-Scientific research and environmental protection
In this context, third States would seek to pose as inevitable actors. Many analyses focus on ambitious Asian and European projects in the Arctic. Clearly, while the governments of third States display an indecisive Arctic foreign policy now, there is no indication that they will challenge the claims of neighboring Countries or seek to assert themselves to maintain their rights (Jakobson 2010). In fact, based on the doctrine of third States the main stake is that each country can have access to the Arctic Ocean regardless of its geographical location according to international law.
Obviously, for Russia, the presence in the far North is associated with the ambition to reaffirm the status of a great power and to build a distinguished Russian identity. This translates into a permanent military presence to counter that of NATO. For example, Russia warns that increased NATO activities in the Arctic could erode constructive cooperation between riparian States. For its part, the European Union sees the Arctic as one of its priorities for its future strategy in terms of energy security, maritime transport, resource extraction and fisheries. Although the European Union is not a unified actor on Arctic issues, yet it is a world leader in action to combat climate change, and a major contributor to Arctic research and relevant technologies such as carbon storage.
Although, while the overlapping territorial claims in the Central Arctic Ocean beyond the physical Continental Shelf make it difficult to assess the exact maritime boundaries of the five Arctic States, what rights will third States have in international waters and the Arctic Zone? If the volume of maritime navigation in the Arctic remains limited for the near future at least up to the lines of the Northwest Passage and the Northeast Route situated well beyond the territorial waters of the Coastal States, yet the navigation in the Central Arctic will develop with the continued withdrawal of the glacier pack ice by 2050, third States will have the right to access it under international law (U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey Office of Communications and Publishing 2013).
Dominant State actors in the Arctic Ocean
Russia has made its military presence in the Arctic Ocean a priority lately. This policy is concretized well on the ground by the sending of personnel and military equipment on the most extreme base in the north of the Franz Josef Archipelago. Russian military troops returned to this remote and abandoned region in 1990 since Soviet Union times. Early this year the region saw the arrival of three of the Russian nuclear submarines as well as fighter planes monitoring the North Pole. So, the Russian Navy sends its nuclear vessel Peter the Great to maneuver in Arctic waters. Russian military equipment deployed in the far north region includes MiG31BM supersonic interceptor aircraft, as well as new radar systems near the coast of Alaska (The state-run Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies 2021).
High-tech weapons are also regularly tested in the Arctic region by Russia and NATO members. Russia undoubtedly has the most advanced navigation technology in the Arctic, with a powerful fleet of nuclear icebreakers, which is not the case for the other Arctic States. The Russian navy is projecting to use the Belgorod Submarine, developed to be equipped with Poseidon torpedo, one of the most advanced military weapons. These new arms are first of all for dissuasion of enemies, and to show the ability of the Russian navy to the marine combat. With global warming which will facilitate navigation and the merchant navy including exports from large oil and gas reserves, Russia wishes to face new security challenges in the Arctic. In this context, Russia qualifies this military equipment as the main instrument to protect its economic interests, as well as its geostrategic borders (Russia’s state news agency, RIA Novosti, 2021).
Moreover, the United States describes this heavy Russian military presence in the Arctic region as unprecedented since the end of the Second World War. In response to this Russian military action, the United States recently deployed the B1Qs nuclear bomber in the Arctic territory of Norway, which carried out air controls near international borders. Furthermore, with global warming and the disappearance of the Arctic ice pack, the maritime borders of the States of the region are becoming more and more vulnerable (Rainsford 2021).
Thus, when we speak of the Arctic actors, it is not only a question of the regional Arctic powers, but new States have also become major strategic actors in the region and without having any maritime access to the Arctic Ocean. This is the case for example of China. This new industrial power needs to expand its influence in the world, and therefore it is in search of natural resources to fuel its industry, and new shipping routes to expand its merchant navy as part of one belt one road initiative. Indeed, while Russia describes China as an important strategic partner in the region with shared investments in the hydrocarbon sector, Western Arctic States and particularly the United States and Canada characterize it as a new threat to security and stability in the Arctic Ocean.
Arctic ocean issues and International Law
During the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982 (UNCLOS), the provisions matched the reality of the Arctic at the time. Today, the scope of this Convention will be limited with the new challenges which will appear in the near future such as the legal consequences of the massive disappearance of the ice floe due to global warming, the rise of the voice on the protection of the indigenous peoples human rights, security issues, the race to exploit natural resources, navigation in the Arctic straits, the underlying military and submarine actions, the presence of nuclear weapons and the return of tensions between Russia and NATO. These are among the issues that cannot be addressed by UNCLOS alone, most of whose rules except article 234 are made to apply to flowing waters and not frozen waters. It is a framework instrument of its kind, which is intended to facilitate the management of the sea in a way that considered a variety of interests at the time of its development (Schönfeldt 2017).
Thus, the United States continues to rely on customary international law as its legal reference in the first place. For example, according to this Country the law of the seabed of the Oceans was not drafted in their interests, for this reason they do not recognize the international jurisdiction of the International Seabed Authority over the Area and refuse the sharing of the exploitation revenues of the Continental Shelf located beyond the jurisdiction of the riparian States (Byers 2020).
Generally, each Arctic State considers independently adopting and implementing both its national legislation and the norms of public international law that it considers to be convergent with its domestic interests. For example, the title of the outer Arctic Continental Margin is singular compared to the title of the Area within 200 nautical miles (NM) from the baselines of the Coastal States, because the five Arctic Coastal States have an inherent title in the area of 200NM, but they do not all have the title of the Arctic Zone beyond 200NM from the baselines, their jurisdiction cannot be exercised beyond 350NM, which is an International Sea Zone, and under the jurisdiction of the International Seabed Authority (Franckx 2014).
Moreover, the omission of the substance of article 77 of UNCLOS therefore leaves uncertainty as to the series of environmental legal frameworks that will apply to the new extensions of the Continental Shelves in terms of conservation and environmental protection (Theutenberg 1984). Two interpretations clash concerning the legal status of the seabed and the seabed beyond the limit of the Continental Shelf around the North Pole; according to the first interpretation, the Arctic region, like any other maritime zone, is governed by the UNCLOS of 1982. The second interpretation starts from the premise that the Arctic was not part of the discussions of UNCLOS of 1982 and argues that the legal regime of the seabed and subsoil of this region existed long before the negotiations of the third UNCLOS and is based instead on customary international law (Pancracio 2010).
The Continental Shelf is defined as the natural extension of land territory to the outer edge of the Continental Margin, or 200 nautical miles (370 km) from the baseline of the coastal State, whichever is greater. A Sate’s Continental Shelf can exceed 200 nautical miles (370 km) until the end of natural prolongation. However, it should never exceed 350 nautical miles (650 kilometers) from the baseline; or it can never exceed 100 nautical miles (190 kilometers; 120 nautical miles) beyond the 2,500-meter isobath (the line connecting the 2,500-meterdepth) (Dodds 2008). Coastal States have the right to harvest mineral and non-living material from the subsoil of their Continental Shelf. Coastal States also have exclusive control over living resources attached to the Continental Shelf, but not over living resources in the water column beyond the exclusive economic zone.
In addition to its provisions defining oceanic boundaries, the law of the sea establishes general obligations for the safeguard of the marine environment and the right to scientific research on the High Seas for third States and creates an innovative legal regime to control the exploitation of mineral resources in deep areas beyond national jurisdiction. Thus, third States with or without a coast have a right of access to the High Arctic Seas, without restriction on the part of the transit States (Sefrioui 2015).
Conclusion
The emergence of the problems which Arctic coastal States are facing today in the Arctic pushes the time to adopt an international convention in order to balance between the interests of the Arctic States and the third States. Indeed, faced with the complexity of the issues, the need for the international community to have a solid legal system is becoming increasingly evident with the disappearance of the frozen ice in the Arctic Ocean.
In explaining the contemporary main issues in this region, we identified the role that political discourse plays in the specific application of international law, such as the extent of the spread of identity today in the Arctic Ocean. Looking at how interests are consciously used in Arctic issues as the foundation of international relations, the normative force of international law is firmly established to assess the political decisions of Arctic and Non-Arctic States. Policies established in accordance with conventions and rules entice State actors to their validation and interpretation.
References
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 10 December 1982, UNTR.9 (Effective: 16 November 1994)
Arctic Council Ministerial 20 May 2021, Reykjavik, Iceland. Ministerial documents, Reykjavik declaration (2021), Arctic Council Strategic Plan
U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey Office of Communications and Publishing 2013
The state-run Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies 2021
Russia’s State News Agency, RIA Novosti, 2021
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Sarah Rainsford, «Russia flexes muscles in challenge for Arctic control», BBC News 2021
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Theutenberg, Bo Johnson. The evolution of the Law of the Sea: A Study of Resources and Strategy with Special Regard to the Polar Regions, London, Tycooly Inti Publishing, 1984
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