The Economic Foundations and Consequences of Thailand’s Military Junta
The recent coups and military junta in Thailand are a product of marginalising military power. When the defence budgets remain static, military personnel become indignant. In developing countries with a strong military presence, taking power away from the military harm’s democracy in the long term. A small defence budget is damaging for democracy, as the military will express grievance at the lack of priority given to modernising defence (Nidhiprabha, 2019). This grievance is expressed through coups, which subsequently result in the economic mismanagement of the economy. As Kim et al. (2013) analysis of military spending indicates, military regimes allocate more to defence budgets, leaving areas of education and health underfunded.
Since Thailand established a constitutional monarchy in 1932, there have been 18 coups. The longest ‘peace’ from coups was a 15-year stint, between 1991 – 2006. The hiatus from coups stems from large scale protests in 1992, against the military government. An event called Black May. 52 officially confirmed dead, many missing and over 3,500 arrested; many of which were tortured. Due to the atrocities of Black May, the military realised the lack of public support for their intervention in politics, causing them to step down from domestic affairs.
The ‘peaceful’ period without coups ended in 2006, due to a lack of recognition of the military in politics. As Thailand faced the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, GDP contracted to -7.6%, which correlates with a decline in military spending. As the economy picked up, military spending remained the same after the crisis. Defence austerity and marginalising the military from politics caused growing indignation that resulted in the 2014 military junta.
Thailand’s dissolving of absolute monarchy in 1932 is the product of a military coup. The military are seen by some as symbolic in creating order and prosperity in Thailand. Thai politics is characterised as a ‘Network Monarchy’ (McCargo, 2005). The monarchy, revered by the public, acts as a moral instructor of national issues. The Privy council, a body of appointed military personnel that advise the monarchy, work together to permit a representative government whilst seeking to undermine the latter and create their own agenda, that is legitimised by the monarch through speeches to the public. Prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra (2001 – 2006), a populist telecommunications tycoon, sought to dismantle the network monarchy, by reducing military’s political power. Opposition to network monarchy is seen as the antithesis to national identity and national interest as the military and monarchy are symbolic of a nostalgic past that created the nation-state.
To achieve peace and prosperity in Thailand, democratic governments should keep the military informed and inclusive in politics. Under a military government, the country is unable to achieve its growth potential. Since the junta in 2014, Thailand has exhibited the slowest growth out of all ASEAN-10 members. An average of 3%, compared with nearby Vietnam with an average 6.6%, during the same period. In contrast, Thailand’s democratic governments can achieve growth between 6-8%. The failure of these governments was their inability to garner support from the military, paving the way for the junta. The country’s sharp declines in GDP in the 21st century have occurred from unprecedented events such as: the 2008 financial crises, devasting floods in 2011 and political protests in 2013.
The current administration’s economic mismanagement is predicted to stay. The current constitution allows the military to allocate 250 seats of the upper house. Moreover, governments and parties that sought to reform or combat military power have seen their powers significantly reduced. Thaksin was ousted due to explicit marginalisation of the military. Future Forward party, calling for reforms of military and the constitution is now dissolved, and the founder banned from politics for 10 years. Leaving no channel to voice dissent.
Eradicating the military’s powers is not pragmatic. Limiting their powers fuels their grievances. Paradoxically, a lack of military involvement has led to a deteriorating economy and democracy. Military governments spend much more than other regimes on defence spending, whilst taking the budget from other areas. In March 2017, Thailand’s National Legislative Assembly approved 211 billion baht towards the defence budget, whilst cutting the education budget by 4.7%. Moreover, as GDP has declined in recent years, military spending continues to increase significantly. What is apparent is attempts to curb military power provides them with more. What is required is a party with moderate reform, keeping the network monarchy on their side, so the country can reap the economic potential and return growth to the same levels as previously enjoyed. Military spending should not sustain at low levels if democracy is to survive.
References:
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/5/24/thailands-parliament-meets-but-military-retains-upper-hand
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-51585347
https://www.ft.com/content/88970d60-e1b0-11e3-9999-00144feabdc0
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/thailand/coup-1991.htm
Kim, H.C., Kim, H.M. and Lee, J., 2013. The post-coup military spending question revisited, 1960–2000. International Interactions, 39(3), pp.367-385.
McCargo, D., 2005. Network monarchy and legitimacy crises in Thailand. The Pacific Review, 18(4), pp.499-519.
Nidhiprabha, B., 2019. Macroeconomic Policy for Emerging Markets: Lessons from Thailand. London: Routledge.
