Turkey, Libya and the Construction of European Immigration Policies
On the 29th of June, the European Parliament and Council agreed to turn the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) into the European Union Agency of Asylum (EUAA). The premise is that, after the refugee crisis of 2015, the European Union, as a supranational institution, has consistently tried to find common solutions to the issue of immigration within the limit of its ability to do so. The New Asylum Pact on Immigration, proposed by the European Commission (EC) in September 2020, imprints on three dimensions that aim at distancing the EC from the narrative and legislative constraints of the Dublin Convention and Regulations. The first dimension aims to strengthen relations with neighbouring countries, thus enforcing the idea of the securitization theory and external financing streams. Secondly, the EU aims to strengthen the services for screening, welcoming structures and a rapid repatriation mechanism for individuals who are not allowed into Europe. Thirdly, the Commission proposes that the costs of repatriation shall be paid directly by member states when they refuse to let immigrants within their borders.
The EU is, for now, focusing on maintaining order at borders and minimizing entries. The program follows the securitization theory, mainly envisaged by the ex-Italian Minister of the Interior, Marco Minniti (2017-2018). The idea, especially enforced after 2016, was to increase control at borders, decrease the saving area of the Italian (and other EU states) military, and finance the development of a secure path for individuals to travel from Africa to Europe. The program consolidates the process by which the EU, and single-member states, stipulate bilateral agreements directed at financing neighbouring countries to keep asylum seekers outside of Europe. In recent years, Turkey has been the most relevant actor in such procedures. The relations between Turkey and the EU were valued at EUR 143 billion by the Turkish Ministry of trade in 2020.[1] Currently, Brussels is still financing Turkey to keep refugees outside of its borders thanks to a contract agreed in 2016 that offered EUR 6 billion of financing. However, only EUR 4 billion have been disbursed until today as the financing relations stipulated contractual respect of the rule of law that Brussels believes Ankara has been systematically violating. Today, between Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon there are approximately 5.5 million refugees.[2]
At the Berlin Conference on Libya, organized on the 23rd of June, Mario Draghi and Angela Merkel discussed how best to coordinate a response to tackle the new wave of immigrants (50 – 70,000 in 2021) ready to flee from North African coasts. The preliminary solutions both leaders decided on were to enforce Neighbourhood Development and International Cooperation. The latter is the mechanism that, from next year, will substitute the Trust Fund For Africa, focused on aiding the development of the African continent via foreign investment. The idea currently is to provide the program with an overall budget of EUR 80 billion, of which 10% will be directed towards immigration to Europe. In Libya specifically, the aim is to consolidate the position of the newly installed government of Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh through funding aimed at developing conditions of growth and prosperity in a country destroyed by 10 years of civil war.
Ties Between Libya and Ankara
The European media are justly focusing on the elections in Germany in 2021 and France in 2022 – two events that will shake the EU’s leadership, especially in the case of a Le Pen victory in France. In France especially, it is for electoral reasons that the narrative of immigration is shifting from one of integration to one emphasising border control, imbued with fear and diffidence. Yet, whilst the next year and a half will re-arrange the internal settlement of the union, it is the external events in the European neighbourhood that may seriously undermine the potential of the New Asylum Pact.
The lack of supranational responses and distribution mechanisms will inevitably become problematic in the near future. Despite the limits to its scope of action, the EU is effectively trying to shift to a supranational mechanism aimed at overcoming the Dublin regulations. The Dublin Regulation 604/2013 is a European law that determines which member state is responsible for the application for asylum under the Geneva Convention and the EU Qualification Directive. The Dublin ‘regime’ was first established in 1990 and applied in 1997, ensuring that receiving states would hold authority over asylum cases. This caused disproportionate responsibilities among EU states, developing into the primary source of internal conflict within the EU. Whilst the Dublin ‘regime’ was extended to the Dublin II regulation in 2003, and then the Dublin III Regulation in 2013, the principles of disproportionate responsibilities remained mostly intact.
However, the EU and its member states are currently only plugging holes. Without looking too much into longer-term scenarios of demographic crisis and an inevitable increase in immigration, there is one state, particularly, that demands the EU’s attention: Turkey. At the end of June, Erdogan announced the beginning of the construction of the Istanbul Canal. The Istanbul Canal, an alternative to the Bosporus, approximately 60 km from Istanbul, will connect the Mediterranean to the Black Sea. Significantly, the canal will not be included in the 1936 Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits. The Montreux Convention gave regulation of the Bosporus and the Dardanelle Straits to Turkey to control the peaceful crossing of ships and the restriction of naval vessels not belonging to states overlooking the Black Sea. Operating the canal, therefore, brings severe geopolitical implications. How will it be used? Will Turkey decide which States will be able to bring military ships inside the Black Sea and remain for more than the 21 days outlined by the agreements? If yes, then how will this be seen by other states overlooking the Black Sea – especially the Russian army in Crimea?
Besides theoretical geopolitical concerns, there are also serious tangible issues that arise. The first is climatic. A humongous construction (including artificial lakes and residential areas) in a seismic area may have serious repercussions. The second is economic. Compared to the dollar, the Turkish Lira devalued by 30% between January and November 2020, and inflation increased to 15.6% in February 2021.[3] The third is political (and linked to the economic). The country is increasingly polarised, with Erdogan’s support wavering in the big cities of Istanbul and Ankara while remaining high in rural areas. This implies a double-speed country that perceives political reality in an antipodal manner. The political polarization evident in the country will likely reach its peak by 2023, the year of the elections. Whatever the result, how will such a divided civil society react? Moreover, due to the EU’s negligence in MENA, Erdogan has increased his grip in Northern Africa, especially in Libya with his recent support for Al Serraj. Since 2002, with the rise of the AKP (Erdogan’s party) Ankara has been increasingly interested in building relations with African states. By 2005 for instance, Erdogan, at the time Prime Minister, had visited Ethiopia and South Africa to inaugurate his ‘Year for Africa’. The partial control of Libya may betray strategic motives to fulfil the government’s intentions to almost double economic relations with Africa from $26 billion to $50 in the next 10-15 years.[4] This is because the control of Libya allows the fulfilment of myriad Turkish interests, including: a) military (naval and air bases) b) geopolitical power struggle with rival Arab forces c) undermining the emergence of the new Eastern Mediterranean energy canal that excludes Ankara from its projects. However, the validity of all these objectives resides on the presumption of political and economic stability in Turkey that Erdogan, and Turkey’s socio-political polarization, cannot even remotely guarantee.
In this sense, Turkey’s future will be pivotal for the EU. Its heavy presence in Libya, especially Tripolitania, and its control of refugees, represent a challenge that shall push the EU member states to reflect on the need for a proportional integration mechanism. If economic deterioration (along with political polarization) does not cease, the likely consequences will be that the Turkish population may be the one to soon become the asylum seekers in Europe. Such circumstances would unleash unprecedented numbers of asylum seekers who, with the contemporary immigration plan, the EU would be unable to manage. Such a scenario would also represent a challenge for Libya and its precarious political conditions, given the heavy Turkish presence in the territory. It is, therefore, crucial to work on agreements between Libya and Turkey, directing the countries towards liberal economic policies aimed at restructuring the economy and encouraging the distancing of political and religious narratives – two elements that Erdogan and his party have been consistently trying to connect. Such actions undermine the principles of the rule of law and human rights and distance the Turkish government from the Copenhagen criteria that unite EU member states.
To conclude, the New Asylum Pact and its external control of frontiers may momentarily placate member states by calming the electorate on a sensitive topic. Yet, it is a myopic program when looking at the likely risks in the near future. It is, therefore, imperative to reflect on the situation in the EU’s neighbourhood and evaluate the political instability that reigns in states like Turkey, Libya and Egypt. Primarily, such an evaluation should highlight the urgent need for a European immigration policy that aims to integrate and redistribute, rather than merely controlling and preventing entrances. The Commission, given its limited authority, cannot enforce a united response. The ball thus passes to Member states, that are now called to write the future of their countries, and especially Europe.
References:
Dalay, Galip. “Turkey’s Libya Policy: New Flexibility, New Goals.” ISPI, 24 June 2021, www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/turkeys-libya-policy-new-flexibility-new-goals-30609.
Talbot, Valeria. “Turchia: Nuova Crisi Della Lira in Vista?” ISPI, 24 June 2021, www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/turchia-nuova-crisi-della-lira-vista-29763.
Anastasio, Nick. “La Turchia Punta Sull’Africa: Una Sfida Di Erdogan All’Occidente?” Rivista Africa, 4 June 2021, www.africarivista.it/la-turchia-punta-sullafrica-una-sfida-di-erdogan-alloccidente/186364/.
Mezran, Karim. “After Berlin II: What’s Next for the Future of Libya?” ISPI, 30 June 2021, www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/after-berlin-ii-whats-next-future-libya-31010.
Talbot, Valeria. “Turchia: Kanal Istanbul, Il ‘Folle’ Progetto Di Erdogan.” ISPI, 1 July 2021, www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/ispitel-turchia-kanal-istanbul-il-folle-progetto-di-erdogan-31021.
LimesGeopolitics, director. Draghi-Merkel. Il Patto Sui Migranti Con La Turchia (e La Libia..). YouTube, YouTube, 24 June 2021, www.youtube.com/watch?v=54N9v86CA9k.
Cerrettelli, Adriana. Emergenza Sbarchi, Al Vertice UE Un Primo Momento Di Verità. Sole24Ore, 22 June 2020.
al Nord Africa, «Soldi. “‘Soldi Al Nord Africa’. La Ue Sceglie Di Pagare per Fermare i Migranti: Sul Tavolo 8 Miliardi.” Il Messaggero, Il Messaggero, 24 June 2021, www.ilmessaggero.it/politica/migranti_europa_decide_pagare_soldi_nord_africa_cosa_succede-6042630.html.
[1] https://www.trade.gov.tr/turkey-and-eu/turkey-and-the-eu#:~:text=In%20this%20respect%2C%20the%20volume,EU%20reached%2073%20billion%20USD.
[2] Video Limes
[3] https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/turchia-nuova-crisi-della-lira-vista-29763
[4] https://www.africarivista.it/la-turchia-punta-sullafrica-una-sfida-di-erdogan-alloccidente/186364/
