Uzbekistan`s New Foreign Policy: Rekindling Regional Ties in Central Asia

Abstract: Since Shavkat Mirziyoyev has taken office as President of Uzbekistan, the Central Asian region has entered a new era of cooperation. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to give an adequate explanation to unexpected changes and an abrupt reactivation of regional ties in Central Asia (CA). The article argues that these changes have been spurred by modification of Uzbekistan`s foreign policy towards the region. What foregrounds this investigation is that nothing has changed conceptually in the regional policy of Tashkent, — as the latter has always prioritized its relations with neighbors, — however, Mirziyoyev`s approach and attitude towards CA cardinally differs from that of Islam Karimov`s.

Introduction

Since its very independence in 1991, Uzbekistan has emphasized Central Asia (CA) as a foremost priority in its foreign policy agenda. This is reasoned by the fact that five «stans» (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) are tied by a common culture, values, traditions, religion, history, and even problems. Notwithstanding these uniting factors, however, up until Shavkat Mirziyoyev came to power, relations among CA states had frequently been stalemating.

Thus, this essay has two main goals. First, it aims to unveil what precipitated regional fragmentation and brought about persistent strained relations and antagonism among CA states. Second, the essay attempts to explain how alterations made in the foreign policy of Uzbekistan towards CA under Shavkat Mirziyoyev`s administration have broken the ice and accelerated the strengthening of regional ties.

This article is broken down into two sections. The first section discusses relations among CA states in retrospect. It touches upon several periods, ranging from the time right after the demise of the Soviet Union, when the region was in need of outside assistance, the lack of which prompted them to launch pseudo-integration projects, to the period of crisis in relations among individual states of the region. The following section will focus on the transformation of Uzbekistan`s approach and attitude towards the CA affairs and how this transformation made it possible to reinvigorate regional ties.

The period of uncertainty: the ‘‘region-pariah’’

An unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union bored its least developed erstwhile five CA republics into a stupor. Indeed, the five CA states were reluctant to proclaim their independence initially. A ‘‘funeral’’ mood among leaders of the five republics was pervading at the Ashkhabad meeting on 12 December 1991, convened to discuss the future of CA in a post-Soviet setting, when a Foreign Ministry official of Turkmenistan said ‘‘We are not celebrating [the independence], we are mourning’’^[1]. Actually, there was a reason for such a mood — ‘‘The future is extremely bleak. The West will help Russia, but who will help us?’’^[2], asked a member of the Uzbek delegation.

Paradoxically, if most empires resorted to all possible means — ranging from promising to improve conditions to using force or the threat of force — to constrain centrifugal forces, striving to secede from the center, then the Soviet Union itself cut its ‘‘colonies’’ loose. The position towards CA, held sway among the Russian elites, was ‘‘everyone for himself’’, implying that Moscow was denying assistance to the region. Yegor Gaidar, one of the main economic advisors to Russian President Boris Yeltsin, said: ‘‘Why should we bail out these strife-torn regions of Central Asia, who share nothing with us — least of all our religion. We should be much better off on our own…’’^[3]. Russia neither wanted to help economically nor keep the republics within the union. This is how the region, once closely tied to the Russian economy, turned out to be unnecessary and was deprived of subsidies from the center.

Other major powers were also passive in helping newly emerged independent states in CA. In the Central Asia context, the US was more concerned with the removal of the nuclear arsenal from Kazakhstan. Thus, American help to CA did not go beyond a mere token pledge to support the independence and sovereignty of the newly independent republics of CA. When it comes to European Union (EU), it was quite busy with preparations for the signing of the Maastricht Treaty that would enshrine the establishment of the European Union, so there was no time to deal with CA issues. Thus, EU assistance to the region has predominantly taken the form of and limited to technical assistance implemented through the program (TACIS)^[4], totaling €944 million has been provided over the past 10 years representing an average of mere €100 million per year^[5].

While the remainder of regional actors, interested in CA, we’re predisposed to capitalize on the chaotic situation in the region. After the break-up of the Soviet Union, on the one hand, Ankara showed keen interest in the region. On the other hand, newly independent CA states were also eager to establish good relations with Turkey, considering the latter as the main bridge leading to the integration into the international political and economic system, hoping that Ankara`s close ties with the West would enable them to receive Western foreign investment<sup>[6]</sup>. Later, it turned out that Ankara`s actions in CA were no more than a geopolitical game aimed at spreading its Pan-Turkist ambitions^[7] and deterring Iran, and inhibiting the latter from ensconcing in CA^[8]. There was a time when CA republics sympathized with Iran as well. However, after Tehran intervened in the civil war in Tajikistan, actively supporting the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan and other radical movements, the CA states, especially Uzbekistan, saw Iran as a religious threat^[9]. Saudi Arabia was taken by ‘‘wooing CA back into the Islamic fold’’^[10], while the region needed feasible economic and financial assistance. India and Pakistan just extrapolated their bilateral geopolitical rivalry into the region.

Thus, having been disappointed in foreign partners, CA states decided to solve regional issues on their own and considered integration as an optimal way out of the CA impasse.

The top-down approach to integration

The history of regional cooperation in CA is more positive than usually acknowledged. In 1993, efforts have been initiated by the five states of the region to rename the Soviet term “Middle Asia and Kazakhstan” into “Central Asia”, affirming that Kazakhstan was an integral part of the region. Moreover, CA republics actively cooperated in establishing the region as a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. Above all, in the mid-1990s, regionalism in CA raised to a symbolically new level — integration.

However, if the integration processes in, say, Europe evolved from coal and steel community to union, with its subsequent expansion, then CA republics decided to apply a top-down approach, which, at the end of the day, brought about fiasco to all integration efforts. In 1994, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan took a bold step and launched the Central Asian Union (CAU), which Kyrgyzstan joined later the same year. By 1998, they realized that the political views of the members are far from similar and came to the conclusion that this step was too bold. Thus, they decided not to touch upon politics and concentrate only on economic cooperation, so, in 1998, the CAU was transformed into the Central Asian Economic Union (CAEU) with the addition of Tajikistan. CA states could not cope with this as well. Hence, in 2001, the CAEU became merely the Central Asian Cooperation Organisation (CACO), which was abolished in 2005 after the Russian accessing to the organization and subsequent decision to merge it with the Eurasian Economic Community.

If we look at why integration in CA did not succeed, then we can underline several reasons. First, the lack of experience pushed them to launch top-down integration. The main mistake on the way to integration was that the CA countries established a union[s] artificially, without experiencing a thorny four-stage integration path (free trade zone, customs union, common market, economic and monetary union). Second, there was a disagreement over the extent of privatization and the market economy. Turkmenistan refused to privatize and fully isolated itself from any political and economic integration projects. Uzbekistan refused to consider a common pricing policy and wanted to retain large subsidies on foodstuffs. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstanenacted legislation that would allow a capitalist economy, private property, and foreign investment with the repatriation of profits, while other republics, on the contrary, vacillated about such steps^[11]. Third, the Russian factor. Although initially, Russia brushed aside the existence of CA, by the time an integration mood was ripening among the CA republics, Moscow reconsidered its attitude towards the region. For example, Yeltsin said: ‘‘We cannot allow a situation where a Central Asian bloc led by Kazakhstan goes off on its own’’^[12]. This position then vividly reflected in practice when Yeltsin`s successor Vladimir Putin asked to join CACO, and subsequently engineered its merger into Eurasia-wide integration structures in 2005, which effectively put an end to Central Asian cooperation^[13].

The period of strains

The following period in the history of cooperation among independent CA republics is associated with a bleak picture. For instance, relations between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan were complicated, controversial, strained and stuck in a state of, as a prominent Uzbek political scientist Dr. Farkhod Tolipov said, “no war, no peace”^[14]. Such tense relations between Tashkent and Dushanbe were grounded on border issues, strict visa regime between the two states; nationalist sentiments; the construction of the Rogun Hydro Power Station in the high mountains of Tajikistan and water usage; and political and personal antagonism between Imomali Rakhmon and Uzbekistan’s first President, Islam Karimov. As noted by a prominent expert on Central Asia issues Shirin Akiner, ‘‘within Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan’s most difficult relationship was with Uzbekistan’’^[15]. Indeed, the tension between these states was overwhelming because of the following factors: the disruption of cross-border services and traffic; disagreements over pricing and payment of the delivery of energy supplies from Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan; the smuggling of drugs and other contraband goods; fears of the spread of terrorism and religious extremism; the exploitation of water resources — Bishkek`s intention to construct Kambarata-3 Hydro Power Plant to achieve energy independence became a contributing factor deteriorating relations with Tashkent, as the latter fiercely opposed this project, worrying that Kambarata will limit or disrupt the flow of irrigation water essential to its cotton fields and farmers^[16].

Although leaders of CA republics always declared that relations with neighbors were a priority for them, in reality, however, it was antagonism that reigned among individual states as was described above. Taking into account such realities, external forces have initiated various platforms in order to intensify the dialogue between them. For example, the Central Asia-Japan format (created in 2004), the Central Asia-Republic of Korea Cooperation Forum (established in 2007), the Central Asia-USA format (C5 + 1, initiated in 2015). But, alas, none of these platforms achieved their goals, because there was no internal impulse — the desire of the countries of the region themselves to find a vantage point and come to terms^[17].

Old concept, a new approach

Central Asia has always taken a foremost place in the foreign policy of Uzbekistan, as was conceptually designated in Uzbekistan`s Concept on Foreign Policy Activity (CFPA)^[18], while, in reality, we had seen the contrary — strained relations with adjacent countries described in the previous section. After Mirziyoyev came to power, however, the situation in the region has started changing positively. In a short time since his inauguration, he could reinvigorate regional ties. Interestingly, he had not shown until recently his intentions to change CFPA^[19], initiated by Karimov in 2012, but he intentionally changed his approach towards its main postulate — Central Asia is a foreign policy priority for Uzbekistan.

In August 2017, Tashkent held an international forum entitled “Central Asia is the main priority of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy”. The commencement speech was delivered by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan Abdulaziz Kamilov, who underscored that Mirziyoyev attaches the greatest importance to CA, defining it as the main foreign policy priority and this is not just a declaration, but a conscious choice, a natural and sincere aspiration of Uzbekistan to establish friendly and mutually beneficial relations with the neighboring countries^[20]. This conference and Mirziyoyev`s statement manifest a changing attitude of Uzbekistan towards the region and imply how a conceptually defined priority in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy is finding its reflection in practice.

Over the short period since ceding to power, Mirziyoyev has made unexpectedly great strides towards increasing the level of confidence among the states and strengthening regionalism in CA. The main steps that brought a thaw to the region were made in 2017. In 2017, Mirziyoyev held eleven meetings and 15 telephone conversations with the leaders of other CA republics, along with two state visits and two working visits^[21]; and such a frequency of meetings and conversations proved real intentions of Mirziyoyev to establish trustful relationships. After decades of inaction, the intractable process of border demarcation between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan began to gain momentum^[22], and Kazakhstan announced that it had resolved all border issues with its neighbors ^[23]. Moreover, he initiated various cultural meetings and bilateral business forums (with Kazakhstan^[24], Kyrgyzstan^[25], Tajikistan^[26], and Turkmenistan^[27]). Air links^[28] and bus connections^[29] between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan were resumed and visa regulations were eased.

Owing to its new foreign policy approach, Uzbekistan has made significant progress in economic cooperation with its neighbors and immediately benefited from it. In the first half of 2017, Uzbekistan increased its trade turnover with CA countries by 13 percent. The volume of trade between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan skyrocketed, growing by 69 percent, while trade with Tajikistan increased by 22 percent and with Kazakhstan — by 11 percent^[30]. This pace of growth maintained^[31] until the outbreak of the corona crisis.

We should also note that the good-neighboring-relations foreign policy of Mirziyoyev reflected during the covid-19 pandemic as well. Although the corona crisis negatively affected the world economy and so the economy of Uzbekistan, the latter sent several humanitarian aids to neighboring countries^[32].

There are several drivers of current change taking place in CA, which are mainly centered around Uzbekistan. According to Ilan Berman, the Vice President of the American Foreign Policy Council, “Mirziyoyev`s declaring to recalibrate Tashkent’s foreign policy toward the neighboring countries”<sup>[33]</sup> facilitated rekindling regional ties in CA. Indeed, behind the success of these positive changes in the region is that Mirziyoyev, drawing upon the past mistakes, changed his and his CA counterparts` attitudes towards existing problems in the region. He, first and foremost, ceased to over-securitize the problem of water usage, border conflicts, etc that were seriously stalling cooperation among individual CA republics. On the contrary, he approached the task through dialogue and cooperation and proved that any issues can be resolved or at least minimized. On top of that, the word ‘‘integration’’ dropped out of the discourse of cooperation in CA. For instance, in November 2017 Uzbekistan convened a major conference ‘‘Central Asia: Shared Past and Common Future, Cooperation for Sustainable Development and Mutual Prosperity’’; in his opening remarks, Mirziyoyev said a lot about the measure that will facilitate sustainable development in the region^[34], but he avoided using the word ‘‘integration’’. And the very point that CA states are not striving to integrate the region, but ‘‘just’’ intensify dialogue and cooperation in CA, in turn, enabled them to gather in Kazakhstan independently of third parties^[35]. We should not forget that Moscow might not stand an integration project in the region, which may play against the interests of Russia.

Conclusion

This essay has discussed how transformation in Uzbekistan`s foreign policy made a breakthrough in regionalism. The article argued that although it has already passed three ears since Shavkat Mirziyoyev came to power, he has not rectified Uzbekistan`s CFPA. However, changing his attitude towards regional issues, such as water usage, border demarcation, Mirziyoyev rekindled regional ties in CA. Moreover, Tashkent’s regional policy confirmed once again that Uzbekistan is a key player in the region and that the ultimate success or failure of regional cooperation depends predominantly on Uzbekistan.

Reference and Bibliography:

^[1] Rashid, A (1994). The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism? Karachi: Oxford University Press, p. 4.

^[2] Ibid.

^[3] Ibid. p. 3.

^[4] Crisis Group, (2006) Central Asia: What Role for the European Union? Available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/central-asia/central-asia-what-role-european-union.

^[5] eeas.europa.eu (2002) Strategy Paper 2002-2006 and Indicative Programme 2002-2004 for Central Asia. Available at: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/central_asia/rsp/02_06_en.pdf.

^[6] Sinkaya, B (2005). Turkey-Iran Competition over Central Asia and the Caucasus: 1989-2001. Avrasya Etüdleri, vol. 25. p. 81.

^[7] Ibid.

 ^[8] Rashid, A (1994). The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism? Karachi: Oxford University Press, p. 210.

^[9] Ibid. pp. 213-214.

^[10] Ibid. p. 220.

^[11] Ibid. pp. 68-69.

^[12] Reuters report on Minsk summit, 22 January 1993 in Rashid, A (1994). The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism? Karachi: Oxford University Press, p. 226.

^[13] Cornell, S and Starr, F (2018). Regional Cooperation in Central Asia: Relevance of World Models. CACI Analyst. Available at: https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13547-regional-cooperation-in-central-asia-relevance-of-world-models.html.

^[14] Tolipov, F (2018). Uzbekistan-Tajikistan Relations: The Long Way to Strategic Partnership. CACI Analyst. Available at: https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13533-uzbekistan-tajikistan-relations-the-long-way-to-strategic-partnership.html.

^[15] Akiner, S (2016). Kyrgyzstan 2010: Conflict and Context. Central Asia-Caucasus (Washington D.C.: institute Silk Road Studies Program Silk Road Paper). p. 38.

^[16] Orozobekova, C (2016). An Absence of Diplomacy: The Kyrgyz-Uzbek Border Dispute. The Diplomat Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/an-absence-of-diplomacy-the-kyrgyz-uzbek-border-dispute/.

^[17] Akromov, O (2019). Centralnaya Aziya: chto prepyatstvuet integracii? Kun.uz. Available at: https://kun.uz/ru/06162927.

^[18] trend.az (2012) Senat Uzbekistana odobril zakon o koncepcii vneshnepoliticheskoy deyatelnosti’ Available at: https://www.trend.az/casia/uzbekistan/2060201.html.

^[19] trend.az (2018) ’Uzbekistan obnovit concepciyu vneshnepoliticheskoy deyatelnosti Available at: https://www.trend.az/casia/uzbekistan/2883337.html.

^[20] uza.uz (2017) Central Asia – the main priority of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy. Available at: http://uza.uz/en/politics/central-asia-the-main-priority-of-uzbekistan-s-foreign-polic-12-08-2017?m=y&ELEMENT_CODE=central-asia-the-main-priority-of-uzbekistan-s-foreign-polic-12-08-2017&SECTION_CODE=politics.

^[21] Zakirov, I and Nevskaya, Y (2017). Uzbekistan’s New Foreign Policy Doctrine. CACI Analyst Available at https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13470-uzbekistans-new-foreign-policy-doctrine.html.

^[22] azernews.az (2018) Kyrgyzstan to pace up border delimitation with Uzbekistan, Tajikistan. Available at: https://www.azernews.az/region/128320.html.

^[23] astanatimes.com (2018) Kazakhstan resolves all Central Asian border issues, announces Kazakh President’. Available at :https://astanatimes.com/2018/04/kazakhstan-resolves-all-central-asian-border-issues-announces-kazakh-president/.

^[24] Zakirov, I and Nevskaya, Y (2017). Uzbekistan’s New Foreign Policy Doctrine. CACI Analyst Available at: https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13470-uzbekistans-new-foreign-policy-doctrine.html.

^[25] Uzbekistan.iv (2018) Meeting of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan businessmen. Available at: https://uzbekistan.lv/en/meeting-of-uzbekistan-and-kyrgyzstan-businessmen/.

^[26] uzdaily.uz (2018) Tashkent hosts the Uzbek-Tajik business forum. Available at: https://www.uzdaily.uz/en/post/45308.

^[27] mf.uz (2018) Business people of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan signed promising agreements. Available at: https://www.mf.uz/en/novosti-uzbekistana/business-people-of-uzbekistan-and-turkmenistan-signed-promising-agreements.html.

^[28] eurasianet.org (2016) Uzbekistan, Tajikistan Flights to Resume After 24-Year Break’. Available at: https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-tajikistan-flights-resume-after-24-year-break.

^[29] vestnikkavkaza.net (2018) Uzbekistan and Tajikistan resume bus connection after 25-year break. Available at: http://vestnikkavkaza.net/news/Uzbekistan-and-Tajikistan-resume-bus-connection-after-25-year-break.html.

^[30] Zakirov, I and Nevskaya, Y (2017). Uzbekistan’s New Foreign Policy Doctrine. CACI Analyst. Available at: https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13470-uzbekistans-new-foreign-policy-doctrine.html.

^[31] Abaturov, R (2019). Ekonomika Centralnoy Azii: Itogi pervogo polugodiya 2019 goda. Available at: https://review.uz/ru/post/ekonomika-tsentralnoy-azii

^[32] kun.uz (2020). ’Uzbekistan sends another batch of humanitarian aid to Tajikistan’. Available at:  https://kun.uz/en/news/2020/05/26/uzbekistan-sends-another-batch-of-humanitarian-aid-to-tajikistan; kun.uz (2020). Uzbekistan delivers $560,000-worth humanitarian aid to Kyrgyzstan. Available at: https://kun.uz/en/news/2020/08/04/uzbekistan-delivers-560000-worth-humanitarian-aid-to-kyrgyzstan#:~:text=Uzbekistan%20delivers%20%24560%2C000%2Dworth%20humanitarian%20aid%20to%20Kyrgyzstan&text=Uzbekistan%20has%20provided%20%24560%2C000%2Dworth,at%20a%20briefing%2C%20Kabar%20reports.

^[33] Khuramov, R (2017). Central Asia’s new political momentum: prospects and challenges. Uzbekistan.de Available at: https://www.uzbekistan.de/en/nachrichten/nachrichten/central-asia’s-new-political-momentum-prospects-and-challenges/ .

^[34] ‘Opening remarks by Shavkat Mirziyoyev at Central Asia: Shared Past and Common Future, Cooperation for Sustainable Development and Mutual Prosperity conference’. Published on 11.11.2017 at: http://tashkenttimes.uz/national/1670-opening-remarks-by-shavkat-mirziyoyev-at-central-asia-one-past-and-a-common-future-cooperation-for-sustainable-development-and-mutual-prosperity-conference.

^[35] Lee, Dmitry (2017). ’Central Asian integration: more real than ever?’ Published on 30.05.2017 at: https://astanatimes.com/2017/05/central-asian-integration-more-real-than-ever/.

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